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Abstract 
SUMMARY OF SUBMISSION 
Submission No. 9901 raises issues of freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, the 
right to bargain collectively, minimum employment standards, and occupational safety and health at 
Executive Air Transport (TAESA). TAESA is a privately-owned airline carrier in Mexico with service to the 
United States and Canada. 
According to the submitters, the flight attendants at TAESA wanted a craft union to represent them to 
address issues concerning safety and health hazards aboard TAESA aircraft, inadequate training, low 
wages, and the non-payment of overtime or payroll tax contributions for social security, pensions, and 
housing. A company-wide collective bargaining agreement was already in existence between TAESA and 
the National Union of Air Transport Workers of Mexico (SNTETA). 
In July 1997, ASSA filed a petition for title of the collective bargaining agreement for TAESA flight 
attendants before the Conciliation and Arbitration Board (CAB). These representation proceedings 
resulted in numerous decisions by the CAB and subsequent appeals by ASSA over a two and one-half 
year period. The submitters assert that the CAB's rulings were not fair, equitable, nor transparent and that 
the CAB aided TAESA in blocking the rights of the flight attendants. 
A company-wide representation election was held on March 22, 1999. The submitters allege that the 
established union, in alliance with TAESA management, initiated threats and intimidation against ASSA 
supporters during the representation election. The submitters claim that ASSA supporters were impeded 
in their attempts to enter the voting station in Mexico City, with armed guards and attack dogs being 
placed on the premises. Furthermore, the submitters maintain that the workers were required to vote 
orally in the presence of the contending unions and management representatives. Despite repeated 
objections by the ASSA representatives, the election was allowed to proceed by government authorities. 
ASSA lost the company-wide election, and, afterwards, those who supported ASSA were dismissed from 
their jobs at TAESA. 
According to the submitters, the CAB conducted a hearing on ASSA's objections to the election and 
determined that the title to the collective contract remained with SNTETA. However, ASSA successfully 
appealed the decision on procedural grounds, and the case is pending once again before the CAB. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
PURPOSE OF THE REPORT 
Submission No. 9901 was filed pursuant to the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation (NAALC) on November 10, 1999, by the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) 
and the Association of Flight Attendants of Mexico (ASSA). 
The submission was accepted for review on January 7, 2000, as it raised issues related to labor 
law matters in Mexico and because a review would further the objectives of the NAALC. In 
accordance with its procedural guidelines, the U.S. NAO completed its review of the case, which 
included a public hearing on March 23, 2000. 
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SUMMARY OF SUBMISSION 
Submission No. 9901 raises issues of freedom of association and protection of the right to 
organize, the right to bargain collectively, minimum employment standards, and occupational 
safety and health at Executive Air Transport (TAESA). TAESA is a privately-owned airline 
carrier in Mexico with service to the United States and Canada. 
According to the submitters, the flight attendants at TAESA wanted a craft union to represent 
them to address issues concerning safety and health hazards aboard TAESA aircraft, inadequate 
training, low wages, and the non-payment of overtime or payroll tax contributions for social 
security, pensions, and housing. A company-wide collective bargaining agreement was already 
in existence between TAESA and the National Union of Air Transport Workers of Mexico 
(SNTETA). 
In July 1997, ASSA filed a petition for title of the collective bargaining agreement for TAESA 
flight attendants before the Conciliation and Arbitration Board (CAB). These representation 
proceedings resulted in numerous decisions by the CAB and subsequent appeals by ASSA over a 
two and one-half year period. The submitters assert that the CAB's rulings were not fair, 
equitable, nor transparent and that the CAB aided TAESA in blocking the rights of the flight 
attendants. 
A company-wide representation election was held on March 22, 1999. The submitters allege that 
the established union, in alliance with TAESA management, initiated threats and intimidation 
against ASSA supporters during the representation election. The submitters claim that ASSA 
supporters were impeded in their attempts to enter the voting station in Mexico City, with armed 
guards and attack dogs being placed on the premises. Furthermore, the submitters maintain that 
the workers were required to vote orally in the presence of the contending unions and 
management representatives. Despite repeated objections by the ASSA representatives, the 
election was allowed to proceed by government authorities. ASSA lost the company-wide 
election, and, afterwards, those who supported ASSA were dismissed from their jobs at TAESA. 
According to the submitters, the CAB conducted a hearing on ASSA's objections to the election 
and determined that the title to the collective contract remained with SNTETA. However, ASSA 
successfully appealed the decision on procedural grounds, and the case is pending once again 
before the CAB. 
 
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS 
The substantive decisions made by the CAB appear to be consistent with Mexican legal 
precedent. While Mexican Federal Labor Law (FLL) recognizes the right to form craft unions 
and to bargain on behalf of such crafts in the workplace, Mexican precedent does not permit the 
fragmentation of an existing contract. This raises concerns as to whether the FLL provisions 
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recognizing craft unions can be applied in such circumstances. 
The review indicates that there is sufficient information to question whether the representation 
election process conducted at TAESA was in conformity with Mexico's labor laws and its 
obligations under the NAALC. Testimony presented at the public hearing suggests that TAESA 
flight attendants were subjected to threats and intimidation by their employer and the established 
union while attempting to exercise their right to freedom of association. Consultations at the 
ministerial level would contribute to a better understanding as to how Mexican law assures the 
integrity of the union election process so that workers are able to freely choose their bargaining 
representatives, including the authority and responsibility under Mexican law of CAB officials 
during a representation election. 
TAESA flight attendants who supported ASSA were dismissed soon after the representation 
election. The dismissals have the appearance of being related to their union representation votes. 
Many of these workers have filed complaints of wrongful dismissal, and their cases are pending 
before the CAB. 
Concerning minimum employment standards, the information gathered by the U.S. NAO 
indicates that TAESA did not make its required payroll contributions to its employees' social 
security, pensions, and housing funds. For its part, the Mexican Government did take legal 
action, placing financial attachments against TAESA and indicting the owner for tax fraud. The 
information also suggests that TAESA flight attendants were not paid for overtime. However, 
Mexico has not furnished the U.S. NAO with the enforcement history regarding compliance of 
overtime regulations at TAESA. The U.S. NAO will continue to seek updated information on 
this matter. 
With regard to the health and safety issues raised, the available information shows that TAESA 
aircraft may have had serious deficiencies, possibly hazardous to the flight crew and passengers. 
Flight attendants also may have lacked proper training for emergency situations. The evidence 
also indicates that Mexican civil aviation authorities undertook a comprehensive inspection of 
TAESA aircraft and suspended the operating authority of the airline after a fatal crash on 
November 9, 1999. The U.S. NAO will continue to seek relevant information related to the 
Mexican Government's enforcement at TAESA of occupational safety and health laws. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Pursuant to Article 22 of the NAALC, the U.S. NAO recommends ministerial consultations 
regarding NAO Submission 9901. 
 
PUBLIC REPORT OF REVIEW OF U.S. NAO SUBMISSION NO. 9901 
1. Introduction 
The U.S. National Administrative Office (U.S. NAO) was established pursuant to the North 
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American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), the supplemental labor agreement to the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The NAALC provides for the review of 
submissions concerning labor law matters arising in Canada or Mexico by the U.S. NAO. Article 
16(3) of the NAALC states: 
[e]ach NAO shall provide for the submission and receipt, and periodically publish a list, of 
public communications on labor law matters arising in the territory of another Party. Each NAO 
shall review such matters, as appropriate, in accordance with its domestic procedures. 
Labor law is defined in Article 49 of the NAALC as follows: 
laws and regulations, or provisions thereof, that are directly related to (a) freedom of association 
and protection of the right to organize; (b) the right to bargain collectively; (c) the right to strike; 
(d) prohibition of forced labor; (e) labor protections for children and young persons; (f) 
minimum employment standards, such as minimum wages and overtime pay, covering wage 
earners, including those not covered by collective agreements; (g) elimination of employment 
discrimination on the basis of grounds such as race, religion, age, sex, or other grounds as 
determined by each Party's domestic laws; (h) equal pay for men and women; (i) prevention of 
occupational injuries and illnesses; (j) compensation in cases of occupational injuries and 
illnesses; and (k) protection of migrant workers. 
Procedural guidelines governing the receipt, acceptance for review, and conduct of review of 
submissions filed with the U.S. NAO were issued pursuant to Article 16(3) of the NAALC. The 
U.S. NAO's procedural guidelines were published and became effective on April 7, 1994, in a 
Revised Notice of Establishment of the U.S. National Administrative Office and Procedural 
Guidelines.1 Pursuant to these guidelines, once a determination is made to accept a submission 
for review, the U.S. NAO shall conduct such further examination of the submission as may be 
appropriate to assist the U.S. NAO to better understand and publicly report on the issues raised 
therein. The Secretary of the U.S. NAO shall issue a public report that includes a summary of the 
review proceedings and findings and recommendations. The review must be completed and the 
public report issued within 120 days of acceptance of a submission for review, unless 
circumstances require an extension of time up to 60 additional days. 
Submission No. 9901 was filed with the U.S. NAO on November 10, 1999, by the Association of 
Flight Attendants (AFA) and the Association of Flight Attendants of Mexico (ASSA).2 The 
submission raises issues of freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, the 
right to bargain collectively, minimum employment standards, and occupational safety and 
health at Executive Air Transport (TAESA).3 It was accepted for review by the U.S. NAO on 
January 7, 2000, and a notice of acceptance of review was published in the Federal Register on 
January 13, 2000.4 
The submitters argue that Mexico has failed to fulfill its obligations under Part Two of the 
NAALC regarding levels of protection, government enforcement action, private action, and 
procedural guarantees. Specifically, the submitters maintain that Mexico is in violation of 
NAALC Articles 1, 2, 3(1), 3(1)(b), 3(1)(c), 4(1), 5(1), 5(1)(d), 5(4), and 5(5). They also assert 
Mexico's failure to comply with the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States 
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(hereinafter the Mexican Constitution),5 the Federal Labor Law (hereinafter FLL),6 and the Civil 
Aviation Law and its regulations. Furthermore, the submitters argue that Mexico is in violation 
of Conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization (ILO). 
 
2. Summary of Submission 9901 
2.1 Case Summary 
TAESA is a privately-owned airline carrier with service to twenty-one cities in Mexico, as well 
as to the United States. The company also maintains an executive air charter service, which was 
founded in 1988. Approximately 1500 workers are employed at TAESA. Of these, roughly ten 
percent are flight attendants. 
According to the submitters, TAESA forced its flight attendants to work overtime, up to 130 
hours per month, resulting in fatigue, loss of mental acuity, and judgement. They maintain that 
the forced overtime impairs alertness and could cause inadequate responses by TAESA flight 
attendants in emergency situations. The submitters further claim that the company did not 
compensate the flight attendants for this overtime, nor for work on Sundays and holidays, and 
that the flight attendants also were denied vacation leave. Moreover, the submitters assert that 
TAESA management failed to keep current its payroll tax contributions that cover pensions, 
health insurance, and housing.  
The submitters also claim that flight attendants worked in unsafe cabin areas aboard TAESA 
aircraft. Flight attendants documented numerous safety and health hazards, including defective 
smoke alarms, inoperable fire extinguishers, and inoperative oxygen masks. They also reported 
non-functioning emergency tracking lights, broken seat belts, and inadequate first aid kits. 
According to the submitters, TAESA did not provide sufficient emergency training and 
retraining for its flight attendants in each type of aircraft to which they might have been 
assigned. The submitters further allege that training simulations of emergencies were not 
provided, such as simulations of an evacuation with fire and smoke in the cabin and simulations 
of water landings. 
Due to the aforementioned conditions, certain flight attendants at TAESA sought representation 
by ASSA in 1997. ASSA is Mexico's largest flight attendant's union. It is an independent craft 
union affiliated with the National Union of Workers (UNT).7 However, the company already had 
a collective bargaining agreement with an affiliate of the Confederation of Mexican Workers 
(CTM),8 the National Union of Air Transport Workers of Mexico (SNTETA).9 The CTM is the 
largest labor union organization in Mexico and is closely associated with the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI).10 
In July, 1997, ASSA filed a petition for representation of the TAESA flight attendants before a 
federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board (hereinafter CAB).11 The representation proceedings 
have involved numerous CAB decisions and amparos12 over a two and one-half year period. 
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ASSA has received some favorable rulings but has not prevailed in its attempt to represent the 
flight attendants at TAESA. 
A company-wide representation election was held on March 22, 1999, after a third union, the 
Union of Aeronautical Industry Workers, Similar and Associated Workers of the Mexican 
Republic (STIASCRM),13 also sought title to the collective bargaining agreement at TAESA. 
The submitters allege that, during the election process, TAESA management and the SNTETA 
threatened and intimidated ASSA supporters. The submitters claim that some flight attendants 
were scheduled extra duty away from voting stations so that they would not be able to vote. 
Moreover, the submitters allege that ASSA supporters trying to vote were impeded in their 
attempts to enter the voting premises. They also assert that the company used blaring rock music, 
guards, and guard dogs as tactics of intimidation outside the voting station. Once inside, the 
workers had to vote orally in the presence of representatives of the company and the three 
unions. According to the submitters, the CAB officials overseeing the election refused to order a 
suspension despite the atmosphere of intimidation. The final vote tally was 1,442 for the 
SNTETA, 102 for ASSA, and 2 for STIASCRM.14 
Following the election, supporters of ASSA were dismissed by the airline. The submitters assert 
that most have filed claims for reinstatement and indemnization with the CAB. These cases are 
pending. 
On November 9, 1999, a TAESA aircraft crashed in Uruapan, Mexico, killing five crew 
members and thirteen passengers. In response to this tragedy, the General Directorate of Civil 
Aviation (DGAC) of the Ministry of Communications and Transport (SCT) conducted an 
investigation of TAESA, detecting problems in the areas of maintenance, operation, training, and 
administration.15 As a result, the DGAC set forty-three conditions with which TAESA had to 
comply before it could resume operations.16 TAESA has been unable to fulfill the financial 
requirement necessary to guarantee the company's viability and has filed for bankruptcy.17 
 
2.2 Issues 
2.2.1 Freedom of Association 
The submitters argue that Mexico is in violation of Article 1 of the NAALC by failing to 
promote labor principles 1 (freedom of association and protection of the right to organize) and 2 
(the right to bargain collectively), Article 2 by not ensuring high labor standards, and Article 3(1) 
by failing to enforce its labor laws on freedom of association through appropriate government 
action. The submitters also assert that Mexico, in failing to enforce its labor law, is in violation 
of the Mexican Constitution, the FLL, ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association, and ILO 
Convention 98 on the right to bargain collectively. 
The submitters also claim that Mexico is not in compliance with NAALC Article 4(1) by failing 
to allow appropriate access to labor tribunals for the enforcement of its labor law. They further 
claim that Mexico did not fulfill its obligations under NAALC Article 5(1) by not ensuring that 
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its labor tribunal proceedings are fair, equitable and transparent, as well as Article 5(1)(d) by 
failing to ensure that such proceedings are not unnecessarily complicated and do not entail 
unwarranted delays. The submitters also argue that Mexico is in violation of NAALC Article 
5(4) by failing to ensure that its labor tribunal proceedings are impartial and independent and 
Article 5(5) by failing to provide remedies to ensure the enforcement of the labor rights of parties 
in such proceedings. 
 
2.2.2 Minimum Employment Standards 
The submitters assert that Mexico is in violation of the NAALC by not enforcing the FLL and 
other relevant laws in regards to minimum labor standards. They claim that Mexico has failed to 
fulfill its obligations under NAALC Articles 2, 3(1)(b), 3(1)(c), 4(1), and 5(5). The submitters 
argue that Mexico did not monitor compliance nor investigate suspected violations of its labor 
law, both of which are called for in NAALC Article 3(1)(b). They also assert that Mexico did not 
seek assurances of voluntary compliance of its labor law, which is found in NAALC Article 
3(1)(c).  
 
2.2.3 Occupational Safety and Health 
In relation to occupational safety and health issues, the submitters argue that Mexico is not in 
compliance with NAALC Articles 1, 2, 3(1)(b), 3(1)(c), 4(1), and 5(5). The submitters claim that 
Mexico failed to enforce the FLL, as well as the Civil Aviation Law18 and its regulations. 
 
2.3 Action Requested 
The submitters request that: 
1. U.S. NAO undertake cooperative consultations with the Mexican NAO in order to 
provide the following resolutions: 
a. recognition of ASSA as the collective bargaining representative of TAESA flight 
attendants; 
 
b. reinstatement of ASSA supporters who wish to return to work, with back pay for 
lost wages; 
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c. adoption of a collective bargaining agreement consistent with industry standards 
for flight attendants negotiated by ASSA; 
 
d. proper payment of overtime, Sunday, and holiday pay, including back pay where 
proper payment was not made; 
 
e. proper crediting and payment of social security, pension, and housing funds, 
including the period when flight attendants were unlawfully dismissed; 
 
f. adequate training and retraining programs, improved airline cabin maintenance, 
and effective enforcement of maximum hour regulations and other safety and 
health standards; 
 
2. U.S. NAO consult with relevant national and international air transport safety bodies 
regarding the health and safety violations at TAESA; 
 
3. U.S. NAO hold one or more public hearings on the matter; and 
 
4. U.S. NAO recommend ministerial consultations. 
 
3. NAO Review 
Submission No. 9901 was accepted for review on January 7, 2000. The review was deemed 
appropriate as it raised issues related to labor law matters in Mexico and because a review would 
further the objectives of the NAALC. The decision to review was not intended to indicate any 
determination as to the validity or accuracy of the allegations contained in the submission. 
In conducting its review, the U.S. NAO considered information from the submitters, the Mexican 
NAO, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and testimony received at a public 
hearing. The U.S. NAO also reviewed legal research material, including an expert consultant's 
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report on freedom of association issues raised in this submission. 
The focus of the review was to gather information to assist the U.S. NAO to better understand 
and publicly report on the issues raised in the submission concerning freedom of association and 
the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, minimum employment standards, and 
occupational safety and health. Included in the review was the Government of Mexico's 
compliance with its obligations under Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the NAALC. 
 
3.1 Information from Submitters 
The U.S. NAO engaged in meetings, telephone conversations, and written correspondence with 
the submitters in order to obtain additional information. As an attachment to a letter dated 
January 21, 2000, the submitters provided the U.S. NAO a copy of an ASSA report to the 
International Transport Workers' Federation detailing the safety and health problems at TAESA; 
testimony given by ASSA President Alejandra Barrales Magdaleno in a lawsuit brought against 
the union by TAESA; and relevant press reports.19 The submitters also furnished the U.S. NAO 
with legal materials pertaining to decisions rendered by the CAB and appeals courts.20 
Additionally, the U.S. NAO was given maintenance reports filed by flight attendants to TAESA 
management, copies of pay records of individual flight attendants, and copies of financial 
attachment notices against TAESA.21 
 
3.2 Information from Mexican NAO 
On December 20, 1999, the U.S. NAO sent a letter to the Mexican NAO requesting information 
on the issues raised in this submission.22 A second letter to gather further information was sent 
on March 20, 2000.23 The Mexican NAO responded with two letters dated April 25 and April 28, 
2000.24 In these letters, the Mexican NAO provided information on Mexican law regarding 
freedom of association, minimum employment standards, and occupational safety and health in 
the airline industry. The Mexican NAO could only provide limited information concerning the 
specific facts of this submission, stating that requests had been sent to the relevant Mexican 
government agencies. The U.S. NAO has made additional requests for this information but, as of 
the date of this report, has received no further material. 
 
3.3 Information from Public Hearing 
The U.S. NAO conducted a public hearing in Washington, D.C. on March 23, 2000.25 Notice of 
the hearing was published in the Federal Register on February 24, 2000.26 Invitation letters also 
were sent to both the employer and the SNTETA through the Mexican NAO,27 but neither sent 
representatives to the hearing. 
12 
 
Eight witnesses testified at the hearing, including representatives of the submitters and three 
TAESA flight attendants. Ms. Patricia Friend, President of the Association of Flight Attendants, 
summarized the basis for the submission. Ms. Alejandra Barrales Magdaleno, President of 
ASSA, addressed the problems that the union confronted in its attempts to obtain a collective 
bargaining agreement at TAESA. ASSA attorney, Lic. Jos‚ Luis Mendoza Garcia, provided 
information on Mexican law. He also discussed the legal efforts of the union in this case, 
including the fired flight attendants' petitions for reinstatement. Mr. Lance Compa served as 
counsel for the AFA and also spoke on the legal issues raised in the submission. Mr. Tim Beaty, 
the resident representative of the AFL-CIO in Mexico, elaborated upon his observations outside 
the voting station during the election. Mr. Carlos Alvarez Tejeda, Mr. Jorge Armando Barrientos 
Vivas, and Mr. Sergio Centeno Mota were flight attendants at TAESA. Each spoke of their 
experiences at the company, especially regarding safety issues aboard TAESA aircraft. The 
statement of Mr. Lebrac Alfredo Robles Rodriguez, a flight attendant who was unable to attend 
the public hearing, also was added to the record. 
 
3.4 Information from the FAA 
On February 28, 2000, staff from the U.S. NAO and the Department of Labor's Office of the 
Solicitor met with FAA officials to discuss the occupational safety and health concerns raised in 
this submission. By letter dated March 31, 2000, the FAA provided further information, 
including the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)28 standards on flight safety.29 
 
3.5 Information from Expert Consultants 
The U.S. NAO also sought information and analysis from a legal consultant on the freedom of 
association matters raised in this submission.30 The consultant was asked to determine the extent 
to which these decisions are consistent with existing Mexican law and precedents. 
 
4. Freedom of Association 
4.1 NAALC Obligations 
The relevant articles of the NAALC as they pertain to freedom of association and the right to 
bargain collectively in this submission are Articles 1(b), 1(d), 1(f), 1(g), 2, 3(1), 3(2), 4(1), 5(1), 
5(1)(d), 5(3), 5(4), and 5(5). 
Article 1 of Part One of the NAALC lists the objectives to which the three countries are 
committed. Article 1(b) calls for the promotion, to the maximum extent possible, of the labor 
principles in Annex 1. The first principle is freedom of association and protection of the right to 
organize, while the second principle addresses the right to bargain collectively. Article 1(d) sets 
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as an objective of the NAALC the exchange of information to enhance understanding of the laws 
and institutions governing labor in each country. Article 1(f) requires the Parties to promote 
compliance with, and effective enforcement of, their labor law, and Article 1(g) commits each 
country to foster transparency in the administration of labor law. 
The obligations of the Parties are identified in Articles 2-7 under Part Two of the NAALC. 
Article 2 discusses levels of protection in the three countries. It reads as follows: 
Affirming full respect for each Party's constitution, and recognizing the right of each Party to 
establish its own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly its labor laws and 
regulations, each Party shall ensure that its labor laws and regulations provide for high labor 
standards, consistent with high quality and productivity workplaces, and shall continue to strive 
to improve those standards in that light. 
Article 3(1) calls for the Parties to effectively enforce their labor law through government action, 
while Article 3(2) states that each Party must ensure that its authorities give due consideration to 
any request for an investigation of an alleged violation of labor law. Article 4(1) guarantees the 
right to private action, as each Party must ensure that its citizens have appropriate access to labor 
tribunals for the enforcement of its labor law. Also important are the procedural guarantees 
found in NAALC Article 5: 
1. Each Party shall ensure that its administrative, quasi-judicial, judicial and labor tribunal 
proceedings for the enforcement of its labor law are fair, equitable and transparent and, to this 
end, each Party shall provide that: 
* * * 
 
(d) such proceedings are not unnecessarily complicated and do not entail unreasonable charges 
or time limits or unwarranted delays. 
* * * 
 
3. Each Party shall provide, as appropriate, that parties to such proceedings have the right, in 
accordance with its law, to seek review and, where warranted, correction of final decisions 
issued in such proceedings. 
 
4. Each Party shall ensure that tribunals that conduct or review such proceedings are impartial 
and independent and do not have any substantial interest in the outcome of the matter. 
 
5. Each Party shall provide that the parties to administrative, quasi-judicial, judicial or labor 
tribunal proceedings may seek remedies to ensure the enforcement of their labor rights. Such 
remedies may include, as appropriate, orders, compliance agreements, fines, penalties, 
imprisonment, injunctions or emergency workplace closures. 
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4.2 Mexican Law 
Freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively are protected under Mexican law. 
The first labor principle is guaranteed in the Mexican Constitution, and both are codified in the 
FLL. Also relevant to the review of this submission are ILO Conventions 87 and 98. 
 
4.2.1 Mexican Constitution 
Freedom of association is affirmed by Article 19 of the Mexican Constitution, which states that 
"[t]he right to association or to hold meetings for any legal purpose cannot be curbed."31 Article 
123(A)(XVI) further asserts that workers have the right to organize in defense of their interests 
by forming unions. Moreover, Article 123(A)(XXII) protects workers from being unjustly 
dismissed because of union affiliation, averring that the employer of such a worker will be 
required "at the election of the worker to either fulfill the contract or to indemnify him to the 
amount of three months wages. . . ."32  
Also relevant to this submission is Article 123(A)( XX), which calls for a CAB to adjudicate 
labor disputes. It affirms that "[d]ifferences between [management] and labor shall be subject to 
the decisions of a Conciliation and Arbitration Board, consisting of an equal number of 
representatives of workers and employers, with one from the government."33 
 
4.2.2 Mexican Federal Labor Law 
Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution is the cornerstone of labor rights in Mexico. This article 
is codified by the FLL. An array of FLL articles have relevance to the areas of freedom of 
association and the right to bargain collectively in this submission. They include Articles 47 
(dismissal), 133 (employer prohibited practices), 244 (dismissal of flight crew members), 357-
359 (right to organize), 360 (types of union organization), 371 (union bylaws), 387 (obligation to 
bargain collectively), 388 and 389 (union representation), 395 (exclusion clause), 527 (industries 
under Federal jurisdiction), 604-624 (responsibilities of CABs), 625-675 (composition of CABs), 
685 (labor dispute proceedings), 708 (disqualification of CAB member), 842 (suitability of 
award), 870-891 (proceedings before the CABs), 892-899 (special proceedings before the CAB), 
and 931 (representation elections). 
 
4.2.2.1 Freedom of Association & the Right to Bargain Collectively 
Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize are asserted in FLL Articles 357 
and 358. FLL Article 357 states that "[w]orkers and employers shall have the right to establish 
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trade unions without prior authorization,"34 while FLL Article 358 avows that "[n]obody shall be 
obliged to join or abstain from joining a trade union."35 Furthermore, FLL Article 133 forbids 
employers to do the following: 
IV. Compel an employee by coercion or any other means to join or withdraw from the industrial 
association or group of which he is a member, or to vote for a specified candidate; 
 
V. Intervene in any manner in the internal activities of the industrial organization . . .; 
* * * 
 
VII. Perform any act in restraint of the rights granted to employees by law. . . .36 
FLL Article 360 defines the types of trade unions in Mexico. A craft union consists of people in 
the same occupation or craft, whereas a company union is open to all employees in that 
company.37 FLL Article 388 covers the possibility of having more than one union in an 
enterprise. Section III of this article states that: 
[i]f there are craft unions and either company or industrial unions, the craft unions may enter into 
a collective labor agreement with respect to their trades, provided that the number of their 
members is greater than the number of those workers having the same occupation who form part 
of the company or industrial union.38 
According to FLL Article 389, if a union ceases to have the largest membership among workers 
and, if this is certified by the CAB, then that union loses the right to be the titular party of the 
collective labor contract. 
 
4.2.2.2 Dismissal of Employees 
FLL Article 47 lists fifteen causes for which an employee can be dismissed with no liability to 
the company.39 FLL Article 244 specifically covers the termination of flight crew employees, 
listing eight causes: (1) cancellation of appropriate licenses, passports, visas, and other 
documents required by domestic or foreign laws; (2) being under the influence of alcohol 
twenty-four hours preceding the start of the flight or during the flight itself; (3) being under the 
influence of a narcotic without a prescription from a specialist in air medicine; (4) violating laws 
relating to the import and export of merchandise in the performance of duties; (5) refusal to carry 
out or continue mercy, search, or rescue flights; (6) refusal to undergo training; (7) endangerment 
of passengers, crew, or property of third parties; and (8) failure to fulfill the special obligations in 
FLL Article 237 and failure to observe FLL Article 242(III).40 
FLL Article 395, known as the Exclusion Clause, gives employers the right to exclude workers 
who are not members of the union holding the collective bargaining agreement at the company. 
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Article 395 reads as follows: 
[a] collective contract may stipulate that the employer shall admit to his employment only 
persons who are members of the trade union which is a party to the contract. This clause and any 
other clause laying down privileges in their favor shall not be applied so as to prejudice workers 
(non-members of the trade union) already employed in the enterprise or establishment prior to 
the date on which the trade union asks for a collective contract to be made (or the revision of an 
existing collective contract) with the inclusion therein of any such "closed shop" clause. 
 
It may also be established that the employer shall dismiss members who withdraw or who are 
expunged from the contracting union.41 
According to the Mexican NAO, an employer could also use the exclusion clause to terminate a 
worker who is a member of one union and requests representation by another union.42  
However, Article 395 is not without regulation. Article 371(VII) specifies that union bylaws 
must include provisions for expulsion or other disciplinary action of members. These provisions 
are as follows:  
(a) a meeting of the workers shall be called for the sole purpose of informing them of the 
expulsion; 
 
(b) in the case of trade unions subdivided into sections the expulsion procedure shall be carried 
out at a meeting of the section concerned; the motion of expulsion shall be submitted to the 
workers of each one of the sections of the trade union for their decision; 
 
(c) the worker concerned shall be entitled to make a statement in his defense in accordance with 
the rules; 
 
(d) the meeting shall hear the evidence on which the motion of expulsion is based and the 
evidence shall be submitted to the worker concerned; 
 
(e) workers shall not be represented by proxy vote by correspondence or in writing; 
 
(f) expulsion shall be approved by the two-thirds majority of the total membership of the trade 
union; [and] 
 
(g) expulsion may be decided only in those cases expressly stipulated in the rules, duly 
evidenced and exactly applicable to the case.43 
 
4.2.2.3 Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board 
FLL Articles 604 through 624 establish the federal CABs as the primary authorities responsible 
for the adjudication of labor disputes, including union representation, within the industries 
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identified in Article 527(I). The airline industry was incorporated into the federal jurisdiction 
under FLL Article 527(I)(18). 
FLL Articles 625 through 675 govern the composition of the CABs. Each CAB consists of one 
representative each from government, management, and labor. All representatives serve a six-
year term. The government representative is designated by the Secretary of Labor and Social 
Welfare and serves as President of the CAB. The labor and management representatives are 
selected in conventions which are held by their respective organizations and are conducted under 
the supervision of the federal labor authorities. In practice, the largest and most representative 
labor organizations, such as the CTM, CROM, and CROC, are chosen to sit on the CABs.44  
The FLL sets out procedures which the CAB must follow in its adjudication of labor disputes. 
Article 873 provides guidelines for determining a hearing date once a petition for titularidad is 
received. It reads as follows: 
Hearing of conciliation claim and exceptions. The Full or Special Board, within the 24 hours 
following the moment it receives the written petition, shall pronounce a decision in which it sets 
forth a day and hour for holding the conciliation hearing, petition, exceptions, offerings and 
admission of evidence, which must be carried out within the 15 days following the receipt of the 
written petition. In the same decision it shall order that the parties be notified personally at least 
10 days in advance of the hearing, sending a copy of the petition to the defendant, and ordering 
that the parties be notified with the summons to the defendant, his affirmative answer to the 
petition and of the loss of the right to offer evidence if they do not attend the hearing.45 
FLL Articles 883 through 891 outline the CAB's standard hearing process, including the issuance 
of awards.  
Special proceedings are invoked for disputes arising out of the application of Article 389, which 
states that the collective bargaining agreement is determined by the largest membership of the 
workers in question. The guidelines for special proceedings are found in Articles 892 through 
899. Article 895(III) establishes that if inventory of the workers is offered as evidence, then 
Article 931 must be observed. Article 931 provides that workers can vote for union 
representation if they were employed at the enterprise when the petition of representation was 
filed; this includes those workers who were fired after the filing date. Management and workers 
hired after the date of the filing are disqualified from participating. According to Article 931(V), 
"[o]bjections to the workers present at the recount must be recorded in the minutes of the 
proceedings, in which case the Board shall arrange a meeting for the submission and presentation 
of evidence."46 
FLL Article 685 calls for the CAB to "take the necessary steps to ensure that proceedings are 
conducted with a maximum of economy, concentration, and simplicity."47 Moreover, Article 842 
dictates that the awards issued by the CAB must be clear and congruent with the petition.  
Finally, FLL Article 708 asserts that CAB members must disqualify themselves from trying a 
case if they have a personal interest in the case. Causes for discipline or removal of employer and 
worker representatives in the CAB are listed in FLL Article 671. One such cause is if the 
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representative "[v]otes in favor of any decision which is manifestly illegal or unjust."48 
 
4.2.3 ILO Conventions 
Relevant to this submission are ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association and protection of 
the right to organize and ILO Convention 98 on the right to bargain collectively. Mexico ratified 
Convention 87 in 1950 but has not ratified Convention 98.49 
The ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations has 
found that efforts by employers to influence workers in choosing the organization to which they 
wish to belong are inconsistent with Conventions 87 and 98.50 Article 2 of Convention 87 allows 
workers to establish and join organizations of their own choosing without authorization, and 
Article 2 of Convention No. 98 provides that workers' organizations shall enjoy adequate 
protection against any acts of interference by employers. 
The ILO also has addressed the existence of multiple unions in the workplace. The ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association has stated that the concept of the most representative 
trade union, and the granting to that union certain rights and advantages, is not necessarily 
contrary to the principle of freedom of association.51 However, the Committee went on to state 
that: 
the workers' freedom of choice would be jeopardized if the distinction between most 
representative and minority unions results, in law or in practice, in the prohibition of other trade 
unions which workers would like to join, or in the granting of privileges such as to influence 
unduly the choice of organization by workers. Therefore, the distinction should not have the 
effect of depriving those trade unions that are not recognized as being amongst the most 
representative of the essential means for defending the occupational interests of their members 
(for instance, making representations on their behalf, including representing them in case of 
individual grievances), for organizing their administration and activities, and formulating their 
programmes, as provided in Convention No. 87.52 
In addition, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
has issued opinions regarding union security clauses, such as is found in FLL Article 395 
(exclusion clause). The Committee has stated that such clauses, which require an employer to 
hire only union members, are compatible with Convention 87.53 In addition, it has asserted that 
clauses which state that employees must remain in the union in order to maintain their 
employment are compatible as well.54 However, the Committee also has noted that workers must 
be afforded the freedom to choose their representative.55 
 
4.3 Analysis 
This section on freedom of association is divided into four categories, covering (1) the legal 
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process, (2) the election process, (3) the question of CAB impartiality, and (4) the dismissal of 
the flight attendants.  
 
4.3.1 Legal Process 
In support of their claim, the submitters presented the U.S. NAO with legal materials pertaining 
to the decisions made by the CAB and the courts, as well as oral testimony. The testimony is 
generally consistent with the legal decisions concerning the description of events. In addition, the 
U.S. NAO reviewed a report prepared by consultants, who analyzed the legal aspects of the 
case.56 
In 1997, ASSA sought to represent TAESA flight attendants, who already were represented by 
the SNTETA under the collective bargaining agreement at the company. On July 8, 1997, ASSA 
filed a petition for representation of the TAESA flight attendants before Special Federal CAB 
No. 2, which then forwarded the petition to its Department for Analysis and Registration of 
Collective Contracts and Domestic Labor Regulations.57 FLL Article 873 dictates that, within 
twenty-four hours of receipt of the written petition, the CAB must issue a hearing date to be held 
within fifteen days, and FLL Article 685 calls for labor dispute proceedings to be expeditious. 
However, according to the testimony of Ms. Barrales, ASSA did not obtain an audience before 
the CAB until forty-eight days later, at which time the CAB refused to hear the union's 
complaint.58  
On September 24, 1997, the CAB issued its decision, stating that a collective bargaining 
agreement that covers all workers in a company cannot be fragmented. The CAB opined that the 
collective contract to which title is being sought applies to all employees of the company and that 
ASSA, as a craft union, lacks scope to represent employees not in the craft and, therefore, could 
not gain title to the company-wide collective bargaining agreement at TAESA.59 To support its 
judgement, the CAB further cited criterion regarding craft unions sustained by the Supreme 
Court of Mexico: 
[t]he preceding provisions [Section III of Article 388] govern cases of competition between 
various unions to obtain the signing of a collective labor contract, but THEY ARE NOT 
APPLICABLE when within a company there already exists a collective contract with the Union 
that holds title to it, so that if a craft union seeks title to a collective contract that has already 
been entered into with a company, industry, or national industry union, IT LACKS SCOPE FOR 
IT, in that the Contract, by provision of Article 396 GOVERNS ALL of the labor relations 
within the Company or establishment to which it applies, since the craft union may only 
represent the professional interest of a portion of all the workers subject to the general rules of a 
collective contract to which the title is sought.60 
On October 14, 1997, ASSA filed an amparo, claiming that the CAB violated FLL Article 873 
and 685 in its handling of the case by ruling on the merits without holding a hearing. On 
December 15, 1997, the Chief District Judge in Labor Matters of the First Appeals Court61 
granted the amparo due to the failure of the CAB to hold a hearing and ordered the CAB to 
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"provide for hearing of the case filed, in which it will allow the parties to allege and prove what 
is in their interest and in due time and with full jurisdiction render a decision in accordance with 
the law."62 
The CAB reopened the case, with TAESA then filing a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Procedural Standing. On October 1, 1998, the CAB issued another decision to dismiss the ASSA 
petition.63 As it had in its first ruling, the CAB asserted that a craft union cannot segment a 
company-wide collective bargaining agreement and that, as a craft union, ASSA could not 
represent the entirety of workers at TAESA. 
On October 22, 1998, ASSA filed a second amparo. The Ninth Professional Tribunal of the 
Court for Labor Matters of the First Circuit64 granted the amparo on December 9, 1998. The 
Court concluded that the CAB arguments provided in its decision determined questions of 
substance (standing ad causem), not whether ASSA had the legal power to appear before the 
CAB (procedural standing) with the petition to begin the processing of the case.65 The Court 
reasoned that the CAB decision deprived the ASSA union of the opportunity to demonstrate by 
evidence through a vote that it had a greater right to the collective contract with respect to the 
flight attendants.66 The Court ordered the CAB to continue the proceedings in accordance with 
the law. 
On February 1, 1999, the CAB vacated its previous decision, and a hearing of ASSA's petition 
was scheduled for February 22, 1999. On this date, a Motion of Joinder was filed to include 
STIASCRM's petition for title to the collective contract at TAESA. ASSA argued that the cases 
should not be joined on the grounds that ASSA only asked to represent flight attendants, whereas 
STIASCRM wanted representation of all workers. On March 12, 1999, the CAB joined the two 
cases and arranged a representation election among all TAESA workers to be held on March 22, 
1999.67 
On the specified date, voting occurred at sixteen airports in Mexico where TAESA was 
domiciled. The official count was 1,442 votes for the SNTETA, 102 for ASSA, and 2 votes for 
STIASCRM.68 During the voting process, ASSA representatives objected to all votes by non-
flight attendants.69 This is in accordance with FLL Article 931(V), which states that objections to 
workers participating in the vote must be recorded in the minutes of the proceedings and that the 
CAB then must arrange a hearing for the evidence to be submitted. In a letter dated April 25, 
2000, the Mexican NAO stated that, of the voters who stated they were flight attendants, 71 
voted for ASSA and 94 voted for SNTETA. ASSA asserts that it received 99 votes from flight 
attendants, with SNTETA only garnering 42 such votes. 
On April 12, 1999, the CAB held a hearing so that the unions could submit evidence concerning 
the objections raised about the individual votes. ASSA presented a list of 876 voters, who 
allegedly were TAESA employees but not flight attendants; copies of their credentials shown at 
the voting site; and a list of 96 voters, whom ASSA claimed did not work at TAESA.70 ASSA 
also submitted public documents consisting of various reports by the Mexican Social Security 
Institute (IMSS),71 which could be used to determine the profession of the voters and if they 
indeed worked at TAESA. On May 17, 1999, the CAB issued a decision not to accept the above 
items as evidence.72 The CAB asserted that "such evidence has no relationship to the process in 
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the instant case . . . because the recount was ordered so that all the workers who render services 
to the respondent company would participate in it and not by guilds as the submitting party 
would have it. . . ."73 
In April 1999, ASSA also filed an amparo, concerning the CAB's resolution on March 12, 1999, 
to grant the Motion of Joinder. The union claimed that the CAB's decision to hold an election 
among all TAESA employees precluded the issuance of a legal decision for the certification of 
ASSA to represent TAESA flight attendants. On June 18, 1999, the Second District Judge on 
Labor Matters in the Federal District74 denied the amparo, stating in his decision: 
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 114, Section IV of the Law in this Matter, indirect appeal 
with respect to actions within a case is only admissible in two exceptional cases A) - When 
involving actions the performance of which cannot be redressed; B) - When they affect 
individuals outside the case. Thus, it is impossible to consider as irreparable those actions the 
consequences of which affect practical or procedural rights and whose effects are merely formal. 
Accordingly, the action being appealed produces only a practical effect without altering any 
substantive right protected by the cited law . . . and thus the admissibility of joinder is not an 
irreparable action, given that it does not harm the fundamental rights provided for in the 
individual guarantees, in that the joinder is presented precisely so as to prevent the issuance of 
contradictory rulings, without involving the deprivation of the right of defense in each of the 
joined actions [and] without altering the substantive issues disputed therein.75 
In its request for the indirect amparo, ASSA included arguments concerning the handling of the 
vote conducted on March 22, 1999. In his June 18th decision, the judge also denied the amparo 
in relation to these arguments: 
[w]ith respect to the action being appealed consisting of the evidence of a recount, the action for 
indirect relief is also inadmissible, in that this involves the handling of evidence in the labor case 
and thus does not constitute an action with respect to persons or things the performance of which 
cannot be redressed. On the other hand, it may constitute a procedural violation . . . and should it 
transcend the result of the decision can be appealed together with the decision rendered, by 
means of a direct appeal. . . .76  
On September 20, 1999, the CAB issued its decision concerning which union represented the 
greater professional interest at TAESA. In ruling against ASSA, the CAB relied upon the same 
arguments previously stated concerning the lack of scope of ASSA to represent all workers at the 
company. The CAB found that ASSA is a "National Union of Workers in the Specialty of Flight 
Attendants, and thus its sphere of action is insufficient to encompass all workers who render their 
services to the respondent company."77 It held that ASSA is not "authorized to seek title to a 
Collective Labor Contract that is applicable to all the workers in the different specialties who 
render their services to the respondent company."78 The CAB stated that a craft union can 
represent only the professional interest of the company employees in that craft and that, if ASSA 
were given title to the collective bargaining agreement, it would be "fragmenting the Collective 
Labor Contract already signed in the respondent company and would affect the union freedom of 
the majority of the workers . . . ."79 
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In response to arguments that Article 388 of the FLL guarantees the right to represent a particular 
craft provided that a union represents the majority of the workers in that craft, the CAB indicated 
that such a right of a craft union does not apply in a case, such as the instant one, where a 
company-wide collective contract already exists. The CAB stated:  
Article 388, Section III of the Federal Labor Law provides for the hypothetical case of 
competition between Guild Unions and Company or Industry Unions. . . . Guild organizations 
may enter into a Collective Labor Contract for their profession when the number of their 
members is greater than that of the workers in the same profession who are members of the 
company or industry union, but there is no provision for the case when within a company there is 
already a Collective Labor Contract entered into with the union holding title to it. . . .80 
In the ruling on September 20, 1999, the CAB also issued its determination on the outcome of 
the vote and ruled that SNTETA still held the collective bargaining agreement at TAESA.81 
According to the CAB, SNTETA obtained a majority in the representation election, garnering 
1,442 of a total of 1,546 votes. The CAB held that ASSA bore the burden of proof regarding its 
challenges to the votes cast and that the union had failed to carry its burden. The CAB asserted 
that "the challenges formulated by the complainant union lack any foundation as they assume 
that collective contracting should be applied exclusively to the Flight Attendants."82  
ASSA then filed a fourth amparo, in which it asserted that the restrictive nature of FLL Article 
388(III) as applied by the CAB is unconstitutional.83 Article 388(III) allows a craft union to 
bargain collectively for the workers in the craft if a majority of all the company workers in that 
craft are in support, but, as the CAB has shown, the Supreme Court of Mexico determined that 
Article 388(III) does not apply in instances where a collective contract already covers all the 
workers. In addition, ASSA argued that the CAB was remiss in not accepting the IMSS 
documents into evidence regarding its challenges to the election of March 22, 1999.  
On February 9, 2000, the Ninth Professional Tribunal of the Court for Labor Matters of the First 
Circuit granted the amparo, ordering the CAB to vacate its former ruling and to admit as 
evidence the public documents of the IMSS.84 However, the Court noted that it was unnecessary 
to reach the other issues raised because the amparo was sufficiently granted on the 
aforementioned grounds. The case remains pending before the CAB. 
The legal case of the Association of Flight Attendants of Mexico v. Executive Air Transport and 
the National Union of Air Transport Workers and Employees is complex, with various issues 
being addressed over a two-and-a-half year period. In order to better understand the nature of the 
ASSA legal petitions, the decisions of the CAB and the appellate courts, and the relevant legal 
precedents in Mexico, the U.S. NAO sought a consultant's independent legal analysis.85 
According to the consultant, ASSA petitioned the CAB to be recognized as the representative of 
the majority of flight attendants at TAESA and thereby be entitled to administer the collective 
labor contract executed with TAESA on their behalf.86 In doing so, ASSA requested a transfer of 
the current contract to it for application to the flight attendants.87 Under Mexican law, the CAB 
would only be able to grant this request if ASSA represented a majority of all TAESA employees 
because the existing collective labor contract at the company applies to all land and air personnel 
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and ASSA does not have a legal right to fragment the existing collective labor contract to apply 
to flight attendants.88 With regard to the request for a count of flight attendants only, it was 
determined that a representation vote "cannot be limited to only one sector of employees when a 
union requests the administration and representation of a [collective bargaining agreement]."89 
Therefore, the consultants concluded that the CAB did not violate Article 388 of the FLL by 
refusing to grant ASSA's request to represent the flight attendants because ASSA sought to 
fragment an existing agreement and did not show the support of a majority of the TAESA 
employees, a point which the submitters do not dispute. 
The submitters allege that the legal decisions in this case indicate that Mexico has failed to meet 
its obligations under the NAALC to effectively enforce its labor law under Article 3(1) and to 
ensure that its labor tribunal proceedings are fair, equitable, and transparent under Article 5(1). 
In particular, they assert that the CAB has not enforced Article 388(III) of the FLL, which 
provides for a craft union to bargain collectively for the workers in the craft if a majority of all 
the company workers in that craft support that union, and Article 842, which states that all CAB 
awards must be congruent with the petition. The CAB ruled that Article 388(III) is restrictive in 
nature such that craft unions cannot segment a company-wide collective bargaining agreement 
already in place. ASSA maintains that Article 388(III) has no set limits and that the CAB's 
interpretation of this article is unconstitutional. ASSA also contends that its petition only 
concerns collective bargaining rights for TAESA flight attendants and, therefore, that the CAB 
decisions are incongruent by their inclusion of all company employees. 
The submitters acknowledge that ASSA's initial petition requested to administer the existing 
collective contract for the flight attendants. ASSA's contention was to gain representation of the 
flight attendants and, then, to negotiate a separate collective bargaining agreement upon the 
expiration of the existing one. ASSA maintains that this was its only option, asserting that 
Mexican labor law does not provide a "window" during which challenges to the existing 
agreement on behalf of a craft union can be made. If SNTETA were to routinely renew its 
agreement before the expiration date, there may never be a time when there would not be an 
existing contract. 
Although the court has not ruled on the substantive issue of whether Article 388 of the FLL 
limits ASSA's right to administer the existing collective labor contract for the flight attendants, 
the CAB offers precedent of the Mexican Supreme Court as support for its finding. It is true that 
the CAB twice denied ASSA's petition without holding a hearing as apparently required by law, 
including once even after the appellate court had instructed it do so. However, a hearing was 
eventually held and it appears that ASSA had the opportunity to present evidence in support of 
its position. In view of adverse rulings by the CAB, ASSA availed itself of the provisions under 
Mexican law to seek review and correction of those rulings. Indeed, ASSA received numerous 
favorable judicial rulings. 
 
4.3.2 Representation Election 
The submitters assert that Mexico failed to enforce its legislation in regard to the conduct of the 
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election and, therefore, is in violation of the NAALC. The testimonial statements presented at the 
hearing are consistent with the allegations made by the submitters. The information provided 
describes an election conducted in fear and intimidation, with employees being threatened by 
TAESA management and SNTETA representatives if they supported ASSA. FLL Article 
133(IV) specifically prohibits employers from attempting to influence workers' affiliation to, or 
withdrawal from, a union and FLL Article 358 states that no one may be compelled to join or 
withdraw from a union. 
Mr. Sergio Centeno Mota, a TAESA flight attendant, testified as to what he saw upon his arrival 
at the voting station:  
And the day of the vote, when we got to TAESA's facilities in Mexico, we could see that there 
was so much security that the company had hired, armed soldiers . . . with heavy caliber arms, 
attack dogs, an electrified wire, to intimidate us so that we couldn't go in to the voting area since 
we were in favor of ASSA. Outside they had a loud speaker system, very loud audio, that went 
beyond safe hearing levels.90 
Mr. Tim Beaty provided further descriptions of what occurred outside of the voting station, 
corroborating Mr. Centeno's account: 
Those observations of mine, while I stood there for the day, included armed security guards, both 
on the other side of the fence, inside the grounds of the company as well as more armed security 
guards up on the roof of the TAESA building looking out towards the street entrances . . . . 
 
In addition to the security guards, the armed security guards, many of them also had with them 
attack dogs. And the attack dogs were also lined up with the security guards along the fences on 
the inside of the company property, clearly focused on the folks that were outside and obviously, 
as well, the folks that were using those entrances to come into the complex to vote. 
 
And in addition to the armed security guards and the attack dogs, there were a series of very 
large speakers that rivals any hard rock concert that I've ever been to . . . . But blaring out all day 
long the TAESA theme song to such a volume that standing right next to somebody, if you were 
near the entrance, you had to yell at the person beside you just in order to be heard. And this was 
the situation for all of the flight attendants that were using that entrance to come in and vote that 
day.91 
Mr. Carlos Alvarez Tejeda, a TAESA flight attendant, was also present at the voting station in 
Mexico City. He spoke of the difficulty that he and other flight attendants experienced in trying 
to get inside to vote: 
Those of us who wanted to change our union, we met very early that day. And at that time we 
were still employees, and we were not given access to the company. We saw how about 1500 
people came to vote and that they were inside, and we were left outside. And we had our 
uniforms; we had our IDs; we were outside. It was raining. It quit raining. It started raining 
again. And then it quit raining again. And then after about six hours of waiting outside, they gave 
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us access.92 
Mr. Jorge Barrientos Vivas, a flight attendant who voted for SNTETA, testified as to how he was 
treated at the polling site: 
I voted for CTM, which is the other --- that was because Mr. Jesus Viva, my direct boss, 
threatened me that if I didn't vote for CTM, I would be fired like the rest of my colleagues that 
voted for ASSA. And that besides, my career in aviation would be over. I had economic 
problems and family problems, and so I saw myself forced to vote for CTM. 
 
I was called at home and told to come to the airport to the main area, which we never did. We 
used to go just to TAESA's hangers. I went to the hanger where the voting was taking place and 
on the trip over there from the main lobby to the hanger, other company members threatened me, 
telling me what I should do, who I should vote for, and that I should have no contact with them 
because otherwise I would be fired. 
 
And when I got to the hangar, I saw that my colleagues were outside. They wouldn't let them in; 
they were being threatened with dogs. They wanted to talk and they put loud music on the loud 
speakers. I voted for CTM. I was taken to a little cubicle far away, and I wasn't let out until 
everyone had gone. And then they let me go home.93 
Mr. Barrientos further stated that those employees allowed inside were encouraged to offend and 
use foul language against ASSA supporters. He acknowledged that some of his co-workers did 
participate in such actions.94  
Mr. Centeno recounted his experience of intimidation when he stated that he was voting for 
ASSA: 
And there were lots of people who were intimidating us and telling us who we had to vote for. 
And telling us that if we didn't vote for CTM we'd be fired immediately. This went on all day 
long. And if that wasn't enough, when it was my turn to vote, I was asked by the polling staff 
who I was going to vote for. 
 
I said I was going to vote for ASSA. I was asked again. "Are you sure you want to vote for 
ASSA?" And I said, "Yes." And he said "Well, okay." At that moment, a security individual 
came over, grabbed me by the arms and took me out to a CTM union representative.  
 
With only three hours left to the end of the voting, thanks to the insistence of the ASSA 
representatives that were in the voting room, the notary finally allowed us to enter, to go in and 
vote. And the notary is the maximum authority there who obviously was in collusion with the 
company. Entrance into the voting was in groups of eight, and it wasn't directly into the area, it 
was to the management office of the flight attendants where confidence staff would intimidate 
us. Again, yet again, so that we would vote for CTM and not vote in favor of ASSA.95 
Mr. Centeno also commented on how he had to vote in front of both management and SNTETA 
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representatives: 
Inside the hanger, there were the voting tables. We had to vote facing the director of the 
company. He was sitting there in front of us. And we had to say out loud who we were voting 
for. There were approximately 300 people [there for the] . . . CTM, when there were only four 
people representing ASSA.96 
Moreover, Mr. Centeno described an incident that occurred in front of CAB officials while he 
was voting: 
When the voting took place, the sister of Captain Abed was there, and she was attacking us 
verbally. She was using foul language. I was here voting, and she was right in front of us, and 
she was intimidating us openly in front of the authorities. And the authorities did nothing, they 
just continued as if nothing were happening.97 
The testimony of Jos‚ Luis Mendoza Garcia, an attorney for ASSA, supports the statements of 
the flight attendants: 
In the case of TAESA they only allowed four of us to be there while the management had 
everyone there that they felt that they wanted to have there. And the other union, they let them 
intimidate the workers, pressure the workers. 
 
In the case of TAESA, the tally, the vote was taken as follows. Behind the voting table, they had 
high chairs where the company's manager was seated with the management team looking how 
and observing how each worker's vote was going. At the same time, they had another little booth 
where the workers would first go in and they were asked who they were voting for. 
 
There they could tell if they were going to vote for ASSA, they would be fired. . . . But to ask a 
worker ahead of time how they were going to vote to intimidate them -- when we told the notary 
publics who were present there who were certifying the vote, when we told them what was going 
on and we asked them to suspend this proceeding, they didn't accept it and the intimidation 
continued to the end.98 
ASSA President, Alejandra Barrales, stated that ASSA did file immediate objections to the 
conduct of the election: 
Yes. We did let the authorities know. We told them about the problems that our fellow flight 
attendants had. Some of them were taken to a room and they were told that they were going to 
tell them how they had to vote. We took this to the authorities and the authorities told us they 
could do nothing because the company was the one that decided, and it was the CTM that had 
the power there. 
 
And we called four or five different times the Undersecretary of Labor to let this person know 
what was going on. And we did so to request that there could be greater impartiality on behalf of 
the authorities . . . we wanted to make sure that they knew that there had been police there and all 
the other things we mentioned. But the authorities told us, "Well, that's private property, and the 
27 
 
company can do what it feels is appropriate."99 
The U.S. NAO finds the testimony provided by the TAESA employees and international 
observers to be credible. It suggests that TAESA management and labor union representatives 
participated in threats and intimidation for the purpose of affecting the outcome of the election. It 
is indicative of a chaotic atmosphere where the ability of workers to exercise free choice is 
questionable. The information is consistent with testimony of similar activities in previous 
submissions regarding the conduct of such elections in Mexico.100 Articles 133 (IV) and 358 of 
the FLL prohibit activities designed to intimidate workers in their free choice of a labor 
representative. Officials from the CAB were present at the election. As noted by the Canadian 
NAO in its Review of Public Communication CAN 98-1, such officials "could be expected to 
bear the responsibility for maintaining order and safeguarding the integrity of procedures carried 
out under its auspices."101 There is no indication in this case that the CAB officials exercised 
such authority. 
The submitters also claim that the requirement to vote orally in the presence of representatives of 
the unions, management, and the CAB infringes on free choice of a bargaining representative. 
While the FLL does not cover which parties are allowed to observe the balloting, the Mexican 
NAO has stated that a CAB official must be present.102 It is the practice in Mexico to conduct 
voting in the presence of representatives of the unions involved and management as well. It also 
is standard for open voting to occur, as secret ballots are provided only if the contending unions 
agree.103 Nevertheless, voting could be affected if the employees must state their choice openly 
before management whose preferences have been made clear and before an excessive number of 
union representatives utilizing intimidation tactics. There is significant information that such 
intimidation occurred at the TAESA union representation election, presenting a clear indication 
of the value of a secret ballot. In fact, the Mexican Department of Labor and Social Welfare has 
stated in the Ministerial Consultations Agreement on Public Submissions US 9702 and US 9703 
that it will make efforts to promote the use of secret ballots.104 Additionally, under the New 
Labor Culture, business and unions in Mexico jointly recommend the use of secret ballots in 
union representation elections.105  
 
4.3.3 Impartiality and Independence of the CAB 
The submitters assert that Mexico is in violation of its obligations under NAALC Article 5(4) to 
ensure that its labor tribunals are impartial and independent and that they do not have any 
substantial interest in the outcome of the matter being adjudicated. The CAB consists of one 
representative each from labor, business, and government.106 According to the submitters, the 
labor representative of Special Federal CAB No. 2 is a member of the CTM, but the U.S. NAO 
does not know the employee representative's affiliation.107 In an instance where a CAB member 
has an affiliation with one of the organizations involved in the matter before the CAB, the 
possibility of influence or lack of impartiality is raised. Under FLL Article 708, CAB members 
must disqualify themselves from trying a case if they have a direct or indirect personal interest in 
the case. Nonetheless, the Canadian NAO has recognized in its Review of Public Communication 
CAN 98-1, "a conflict of interest, real or perceived, could arise if one member has a close 
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affiliation, beyond 'direct or indirect personal interest,' with one of the parties involved in the 
case under investigation."108 Since a CTM affiliate union represents the workers at TAESA, there 
is an appearance created that the labor representative of the CAB may have an interest in the 
outcome of this case. However, the U.S. NAO acknowledges that, in the CAB decision of 
September 20, 1999, the labor representative dissented in favor of ASSA for reasons unknown. 
 
4.3.4 Dismissal of Flight Attendants 
According to the submitters, all of the employees who voted for ASSA were dismissed soon after 
the March 22 election.109 The submitters assert that these workers never received any notice of 
dismissal in writing as required by law. They simply were notified orally of their termination. At 
the public hearing, Mr. Alvarez gave the following statement regarding his dismissal: 
In my case they didn't tell me absolutely anything. They just said, "Sign this sheet because you 
are no longer an employee and leave."110  
Mr. Centeno spoke of how he too was dismissed from TAESA: 
At that time the only thing they gave me to sign was a resignation. As if I wanted to resign. And 
since I didn't sign this paper for obvious reasons, they fired me. They fired me. I was ushered out 
with security guards. And I was given no further explanation. We presume, we know that it's 
because I was a sympathizer of ASSA.111 
Mr. Mendoza testified that the dismissed workers had filed complaints before the CAB, asking 
for reinstatement and indemnization.112 Mr. Mendoza stated that some hearings have been held 
but that, in at least eleven of them, neither the company nor its bankruptcy representative were 
present; therefore, the CAB could not make a ruling in these cases.113  
Mr. Mendoza also stated that, in some hearings, the SNTETA representative claimed that the 
exclusion clause (FLL Article 395) was applied because the workers decided that they wanted to 
belong to another union.114 However, Mr. Mendoza asserted that the workers were not told this at 
the time of their dismissal.115 FLL Article 395 is regulated by FLL Article 371(VII), which states 
that a meeting must be held with the workers in order to inform them of their expulsion from the 
union and to allow them to make a statement in their defense. The expulsion then must be 
approved by a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the union. Mr. Alvarez confirmed 
that he was never informed of proceedings to remove him as a member of SNTETA.116  
Considering the timing of the dismissals and that the discharged workers were associated with 
the challenging union, it appears plausible that the workers' dismissals occurred because of their 
participation in union organizing activities. Furthermore, the U.S. NAO was unable to uncover 
any information showing that SNTETA followed the required procedures under FLL Article 
371(VII) to expel the ASSA supporters from its membership. Nor did the U.S. NAO receive any 
information indicating that the company checked to see if the workers were properly expelled 
from the union before firing them. Instead, the information suggests that the exclusion clause 
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was used as a basis for dismissal after the fact. 
The U.S. NAO is unaware of any decisions having been issued concerning the wrongful 
dismissal cases pending before the CAB. However, the existing information raises serious 
concerns regarding the workers' dismissals in this case. 
 
5. Minimum Employment Standards 
5.1 NAALC Obligations 
The provisions of the NAALC relevant to the issues of minimum employment standards in this 
submission are Articles 1(b), 1(d), 1(f), 1(g), 2, 3(1)(b), 3(1)(c), 3(1)(g), 4(1), and 5(5). Article 
3(1)(b) calls for each Party to effectively enforce its labor law through monitoring compliance 
and investigating suspected violations, and, in Article 3(1)(c), each signatory further commits to 
seek assurances of voluntary compliance. Article 3(1)(g) requires that proceedings to seek 
sanctions or remedies for labor law violations should be initiated in a timely manner. See Section 
4.1 of this report for a summarization of Articles 1, 2, 4(1), and 5(5). 
 
5.2 Mexican Law 
Mexico has an array of laws protecting minimum employment standards. They include the 
Mexican Constitution, the FLL, the Social Security Act,117 the Law of the National Workers' 
Housing Fund Institute (INFONAVIT),118 the Retirement Saving Systems Law,119 and the 
Federal Tax Code.120 
 
5.2.1 Mexican Constitution 
As established in Article 123(A)(I) and (II) of the Mexican Constitution, the duration of the 
Mexican work day is eight hours during daytime and seven hours at night. Article 123(A)(XI) 
states: 
[w]henever, due to extraordinary circumstances, the regular working hours of a day must be 
increased, one hundred percent shall be added to the amount for regular hours or work as 
remuneration for the overtime. Overtime work may never exceed three hours a day nor three 
times consecutively.121 
A day of rest for workers also is provided in Article 123(A)(IV). 
5.2.2 Mexican Federal Labor Law 
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Articles 215 through 245 of the FLL govern the conditions of employment of flight crews. 
Article 233 guarantees thirty days of vacation, with the leave increasing by one day each year 
until a maximum of sixty days is reached. Article 223 states that the total period of duty for flight 
attendants must not exceed 180 hours per month. This includes actual flying time, scheduled 
flying time, and time spent on stand-by duties. Article 224 asserts that the actual flying time for a 
flight crew cannot exceed ninety hours per month. Hours in a workday are addressed in Article 
225, which states: 
[t]he actual flying time of the flight crew shall not exceed eight hours in the case of day work, 
seven hours in the case of night work, and seven and a half hours in the case of mixed work, and 
the said persons shall be granted, before or after completing the said turns of duty, a period of 
lying down rest equal to the flying time. Any hours in excess of the above maximum shall be 
treated as overtime.122 
However, Article 228 of the FLL dictates that a crew member must continue his duties if his 
workday ends while in flight upon the condition that the flight take no more than three hours. If 
the flight is longer, then the crew member should be relieved from duty at the next airport. On 
flights longer than ten hours, flight crew members are to be granted rest on board the aircraft.  
In regard to overtime, Article 230 specifically states, "[w]here crew members are required by the 
needs of the service to work longer than the total period of service, they shall be paid double 
time for each hour of overtime."123 Double time also is granted in Article 232 for performing 
duties on holidays. FLL Article 71 establishes that time and a quarter will be paid to workers 
having to work on Sunday, the weekly day of rest. Article 235 states the following regarding the 
payment of the abovementioned wages:  
[t]he salaries of flight crew members shall be paid together with the corresponding additional 
allowance on the fifteenth and final days of each month. Amounts payable in respect of night 
flying time and overtime shall be paid during the first fortnight of the month following that in 
which the work is performed and the amount in respect of work performed on compulsory rest 
days shall be paid during the fortnight immediately following that in which the duties are 
performed.124 
Finally, Article 136 of the FLL obligates companies to provide housing to its workers by 
contributing five percent of total wages to the National Housing Fund. 
 
5.2.3 Social Security Act 
The Social Security Act, the INFONAVIT Law, and the Retirement Saving Systems Law 
interdependently establish the Mexican pension system. Each worker is provided an individual 
pension account, which is divided into separate accounts for retirement and housing. Percentages 
of the worker's base salary are contributed to these accounts in accordance with the regulations 
set forth in the Social Security Act and the INFONAVIT Law. 
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On July 1, 1997, a modified version of the Social Security Act, as well as the Retirement Saving 
Systems Law, went into effect in Mexico, creating the New Pensions System. Before this, the 
Mexican pensions system was mandated solely by the Social Security Act. Workers employed 
before July 1, 1997, are allowed to choose between the old and new pension plans. The 
submitters allege that the non-payment of retirement contributions occurred both before and after 
the reform of the Social Security Act; therefore, relevant articles in both the new Social Security 
Act and its predecessor will be examined for the purposes of this submission.  
Article 11 of both acts sets out the compulsory social insurance plan, which incorporates workers 
compensation insurance, illness and maternity benefits, disability benefits, retirement, mandatory 
retirement, old-age security, child-care benefits, and social welfare benefits. Under Article 12 of 
these acts, all individuals who have entered into an employment relationship are entitled to 
coverage in the aforementioned plan, and, according to Article 15(III) of the new law and Article 
19(III)of its predecessor, it is the responsibility of the employer to "[d]etermine the employer-
employee payroll contribution liability and pay such sum to the Mexican Social Security 
Institute."125  
Article 168 of the new Social Security Act addresses employer obligations specifically regarding 
contributions for retirement, mandatory retirement, and old-age security. Article 168(I) states 
that the employer is to contribute two percent of the worker's base salary to the retirement fund. 
This corresponds with Article 183-B of the former law. Article 168(II) of the new act also 
requires that both the employer and the worker contribute 3.150 percent and 1.125 percent of the 
base salary respectively for mandatory retirement and old-age security.  
Article 180 of the new law compels the employer to provide on a bimonthly basis to the labor 
union representing the insured workers a detailed summary of the contributions made on their 
behalf. Article 181 of the same act establishes that the Administration of Retirement Funds also 
must inform each worker as to the balance in his account in accordance with the terms 
established by the National Commission for the Retirement Saving System. This article does not 
preclude a worker from making inquiries regarding his account at any time.  
Contributions are to be viewed as tax obligations according to Article 287 of the new Social 
Security Act and Article 267 of its predecessor. Articles 304 and 305 of the new act address the 
penalties for non-payment of these contributions. Specifically, Article 304 states that:  
[i]f by virtue of an act or omission by an employer or other required payer the tax obligations 
under Article 287 are not fulfilled, the employer or payer shall be liable to a fine of from 70 to 
100 percent of the amount not duly paid. Any other act or omission that is detrimental to an 
employee or to the Institute shall be penalized with a fine of from 50 to 350 times the prevailing 
Federal District general minimum wage. The aforesaid penalties shall be levied by the Mexican 
Social Security Institute as prescribed in the pertinent regulations.126 
Under Article 283 of the former law, the penalties were limited to between 3 and 350 times the 
amount of the general minimum wage in the Federal District. Article 284 of that same law states 
that any employer engaged in illegal conduct violating the Federal Tax Code will be punished 
according to the terms established in the Code. Article 305 of the new act is more direct, 
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asserting that, if the employer fails to pay the employer-employee payroll contributions for 12 
months or longer, then it will be considered tax fraud and the employer will be liable to the 
penalties set forth in the Federal Tax Code. 
5.2.4 Law of the National Workers' Housing Fund Institute (INFONAVIT) 
Article 29 establishes the employer's obligations under the INFONAVIT Law. This article 
mandates the employer to pay contributions for each worker employed by the company.127 Under 
the section entitled "Payment of Contributions to Receiving Entities: Integration and 
Calculation," the employer is required to "[d]etermine the size of the contributions of 5% of the 
salaries of the workers employed and make payments to the receiving entities, which act on 
behalf and by order of the Institute, to be credited in the subaccount for housing corresponding to 
the individual worker accounts. . . ."128 
Per Article 30, employers who do not pay their contributions are subject to penalties by the 
Department of the Treasury and Public Credit and INFONAVIT. These two agencies, as well as 
the Mexican Social Security Institute and the local fiscal authorities, are entitled to ascertain the 
amount of missing employer contributions and employee deductions in the event of employer 
misconduct. For this purpose, they can order audits and inspections. The penalty is determined 
according to the terms set forth in the Federal Tax Code. 
As stated in Article 34, the workers have the right to request information regarding the amount of 
contributions in their accounts. The employees can make this request to either the employer or 
INFONAVIT. In addition, Article 38 mandates that the retirement funds administrator must 
inform each worker about the status of his housing subaccount in accordance with the terms set 
out in the Retirement Saving Systems Law. 
 
5.2.5 Retirement Saving Systems Law 
On July 1, 1997, the Retirement Saving Systems Law went into force, co-regulating the New 
Pensions System. While the Social Security Act and the INFONAVIT Law mandate that 
violations are penalized by the Department of Treasury and Public Credit under the Federal Tax 
Code, the Retirement Saving Systems Law does not have this direct requirement. Under Article 
92, the National Commission for the Retirement Saving System must report employers who do 
not fulfill their obligations to the Department of Treasury and Public Credit, the Mexican Social 
Security Institute, INFONAVIT, and the Department of General Accounting and Administrative 
Development. The proper agencies then can take action under their laws. Article 99 also allows 
the Commission to impose fines for noncompliance, and if there is a recurrence of the violation, 
the Commission must set the new penalty as an amount equal or up to double the amount of the 
first fine imposed. Refusal to pay the fine for a single offense within a set time will also be 
considered a second violation and penalized as such. 
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5.2.6 Federal Tax Code 
Violations of the Social Security Act and INFONAVIT law are punishable under the Federal Tax 
Code. The employer's failure to pay social security contributions can be considered tax fraud. 
Article 2(II) of the Tax Code defines social security contributions as those "contributions 
established by law to be paid by persons designated in compliance with the obligations fixed by 
the social security law."129 Article 108 states that "[t]he crime of tax fraud is committed by 
whosoever availing himself of a mistake or by means of tricks, fails to pay all or part of some 
contradiction, or obtains benefit unduly with loss to the federal treasury."130 Article 109(II) 
establishes that failure to pay money withheld or collected for tax purposes to the fiscal 
authorities will be considered the same as tax fraud. The penalty for tax fraud is imprisonment 
from 3 months to 6 years if the amount defrauded is under 100,000 pesos, or, if it is greater, the 
prison sentence increases to 3 to 9 years.  
 
5.3 Analysis 
The submitters raise three issues regarding minimum employment standards. They charge that 
TAESA forced flight attendants to work overtime and then failed to pay the required 
compensation for such overtime, as well as for work performed on Sundays and holidays. They 
also assert that flight attendants were refused vacation leave. Additionally, it is alleged in the 
submission that TAESA did not pay its payroll taxes for social security, pensions, and housing as 
required by law. To support their allegations, the submitters presented oral testimony, copies of 
payroll receipts with corresponding work schedules, copies of financial attachment notices 
against TAESA, and press reports. However, no information was presented to support the charge 
regarding vacation leave. 
At the public hearing conducted by the U.S. NAO, Mr. Barrientos told of a flight from Mexico 
City to Chicago in which he was forced to work overtime. On November 6, 1999, four hours into 
the flight, the plane on which he was working made an emergency landing in Guadalajara due to 
a pressurization problem.131 Both crew and passengers spent hours aboard the aircraft while the 
part was fixed and then resumed their flight to Chicago. Mr. Barrientos recounted his orders 
upon arrival to their destination: 
When I got to Chicago, I informed the crew, the chief, that we were very tired because we had 
been working for more than 14 hours and we needed to rest. And they told us well we knew we 
had to make the return flight to Mexico, since they didn't want to put anybody up in the States. 
So that they wouldn't have hotel and food expenses, they wouldn't put us up, so we had to make 
the return flight. We made the trip back to Mexico, getting there at about 10:00, so we were 
working for more than 24 hours.132 
Mr. Centeno began his testimony by stating that, during his seven year employment as a flight 
attendant at TAESA, he had never received pay for overtime, Sundays, and holidays.133 He spoke 
of two separate occasions in which he worked over the maximum monthly work allowance 
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mandated in the FLL: 
One example of my own situation was the following. In August, 1993, I did five transatlantic 
flights and some domestic flights in Mexico, accumulating a total of 112 hours of flight, and 
more than 240 hours of work, largely exceeding what Mexican law establishes as 90 hours of 
flight and 180 hours of monthly work as a maximum. In December of 1995, I flew a total of 122 
hours in high season, since the company didn't hire extra staff for high seasons, and, therefore, 
we were flying much too many hours.134 
Mr. Centeno also explained his duties at TAESA upon being promoted in 1997: 
I was to intimidate newly hired flight attendants so that they wouldn't complain about long 
working days or the fact that we weren't paid overtime. I had to intimidate them so that they 
wouldn't complain, so that there would be no reason for the company to be upset.135 
The written statement of Mr. Alfredo Lebrac Robles Rodriguez was added to the record of the 
public hearing. Mr. Robles also affirmed that, during his seven and a half years at TAESA, he 
never received pay for overtime, Sundays, holidays, and night hours.136 He presented a clear 
example regarding overtime: 
On the 25th of April, 1996, a sequence of flights was initiated with the itinerary offered in Annex 
"1." As one can observe, we had a total of 121 flight hours in 18 days, when the law establishes a 
maximum of 90 hours of flight per month. This included on two occasions work days of more 
than 30 consecutive and uninterrupted hours, upon rising in the morning until returning to the 
hotel . . . and unexpected delays as in St. Martin on the 7th of May, where we waited around five 
hours because the company had not paid for airport services and fuel.137 
As annexes to his statement, Mr. Robles provided a copy of his official itinerary and 
corresponding payroll receipts.138 Noted twice on the itinerary are warnings that the work hours 
exceed the maximum amount allowable. It is apparent that Mr. Robles worked overtime during 
this period, but his receipts do not show that he was compensated for any such overtime. 
According to Ms. Barrales and Mr. Mendoza, TAESA workers have filed individual complaints 
regarding the payments which they are owed, and these cases are pending.139 
In his testimony, Mr. Centeno also asserted that TAESA did not pay its tax contributions to the 
IMSS, INFONAVIT, and the retirement system. This was ascertained when housing loans were 
denied to workers even though their payroll receipts showed that the contributions had been 
taken out of their salaries.140 Mr. Barrientos corroborated these facts: 
If we ever went to the Finance Department to ask, for example, if we wanted to receive what we 
deserve for purchasing a house, for example, we would be told that, "Well, you need to go to the 
bank, the bank takes care of that." Or "You need to go to the secretary that deals with that." 
When we would go to that bank, they would sometimes laugh at us, say, "What do you mean? 
You don't have one peso. You don't have a right to anything here because your company has not 
made any payments." So, we'd go back to the company and they would say, "We are going to 
improve our company and we are going to make good on all the back payments." But they never 
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did anything. And that was the answer that we would get. 141 
Mr. Alvarez testified that the owner of TAESA was arrested for tax evasion because the 
company had not paid its social security contributions to the IMSS.142 Press reports confirm that 
Captain Alberto Angel Abed Shekaiban was arrested on December 10, 1998, and was charged 
with tax fraud for failing to pay withholding taxes of 28 million pesos in 1996.143 To support 
their claim, the submitters presented documents from the Public Register of Property and 
Business of the 
Table 1: Financial Attachments Against TAESA, 1994-1998144 
Text Version 
Date Amount (Pesos) Responsible Agency Reason Given 
09/94 $49,206,907.30 Department of Treasury and Public Credit Taxes Owed 
04/95 $15,497,347.00 Department of Treasury and Public Credit Taxes Owed 
09/95 $20,007,260.35 Department of Treasury and Public Credit Taxes Owed 
01/96 $20,428,211.28 IMSS Social Security Contributions 
10/96 $524,944.75 Department of Treasury and Public Credit Payroll Taxes 
10/96 $25,029,720.00 Banco Union, S.A. Amount Owed on Loans 
01/97 $26,741,025.72 IMSS Social Security Contributions 
06/97 $500,986,282.05 Department of Treasury and Public Credit Tax Owed 
10/98 $692,060.00 Department of Treasury and Public Credit 
Provisional Payment of Taxes Valued on 
Aggregate Basis for Employer Categories 
10/98 $2,989,848.55 Department of Treasury and Public Credit Omission of Tax Payment 
10/98 $2,234,977.60 Department of Treasury and Public Credit Omission of Tax Payment 
 
Government of the Federal District.145 Between 1994 and 1998, TAESA assets were frozen 
eleven times for debts owed. Eight of these financial attachments were applied by the 
Department of Treasury and Public Credit and two by the IMSS. Table 1 chronicles the history 
of these financial attachments. It is evident that much of the debt owed is for social security and 
back taxes. The tax fraud case against Captain Abed is still pending. 
After the airplane crash on November 9, 1999, the Secretariat of Communications and 
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Transportation (SCT) suspended operations at TAESA and ordered an overall inspection of the 
company, including its finances. Upon completing the inspection, the SCT set forty-three 
conditions which TAESA had to meet in order to resume operations.146 In accordance with 
Article 9 of the Civil Aviation Law, the Mexican aviation authority also demanded that TAESA 
credit its account with sufficient financial capital to guarantee the viability of its operations.147 
Press reports indicate that the company needed an outside investment of US$130 million.148 
Captain Abed was unable to find investors, reportedly leaving the company US$380 million in 
debt with only US$60 million in assets.149 TAESA has been undergoing bankruptcy proceedings 
since February 2000.150 
The witnesses provided convincing and credible testimony, presenting serious allegations 
concerning TAESA's history of non-payment of overtime or payroll tax contributions. It is the 
allegation of the submitters that the Mexican Government did not adequately monitor 
compliance of overtime regulations and mandatory payroll tax contributions nor investigate 
suspected violations at the company. In this regard, the U.S. NAO sought information from the 
Mexican NAO concerning the history of enforcement at TAESA, but, as of the date of this 
report, the Mexican NAO has been unable to provide the requested information. Without such 
information, no determination can be made about the effective enforcement of Mexican overtime 
laws. On the matter of mandatory payroll contributions, the provided information indicates that 
the Mexican Government enforced its laws by placing financial attachments against the company 
and indicting the owner. However, it is unclear if the Mexican authorities initiated these 
proceedings in a timely manner as called for in NAALC Article 3(1)(g). The U.S. NAO 
continues to seek further information from Mexico concerning the history of enforcement at 
TAESA regarding minimum employment standards. 
 
6. Occupational Safety and Health 
6.1 NAALC Obligations 
The provisions of the NAALC that are relevant to the issues of minimum employment standards in this submission 
are Articles 1(b), 1(d), 1(f), 1(g), 2, 3(1)(b), 3(1)(c), 4(1), and 5(5). See Sections 4.1 and 5.1 of this report for 
descriptions of the abovementioned articles. 
 
6.2 Mexican Law  
Occupational safety and health for flight crews are protected under the Mexican Constitution, as 
well as the Civil Aviation Law and its regulations. 
 
6.2.1 Mexican Constitution 
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Article 123(XV) of the Mexican Constitution requires an employer to observe safety and health regulations at his 
company. This article also calls for the inclusion of sanctions in its laws for occupational safety and health 
violations. 
 
6.2.2 Civil Aviation Law 
Under Article 6(V) of the Civil Aviation Law, the SCT is entrusted with the responsibility "[t]o issue and apply 
occupational safety and health measures and regulations which must be observed in air transport services, as well as 
to verify compliance."151 Article 18 obligates the DGAC of the SCT to perform these aforementioned tasks in 
addition to airplane maintenance inspections; moreover, this article gives the DGAC authority to cancel air 
worthiness certificates. Article 7(IV) also specifies that it is also the duty the commander of the airport to verify 
compliance with safety and health regulations in air transport services. For this purpose, the commander has air 
compliance officers at his disposal. 
As mandated in Article 6(IX), the SCT is obligated to promote the training of technical aeronautical personnel, who 
are identified in Article 38 as being the licensed flight crew and the ground personnel. Article 39 states that the 
employer must provide the crew with the necessary training so that services rendered are safe and efficient. Also 
under this article, training instructors must be registered with the SCT, which determines the appropriate 
certification guidelines for assuring safety aboard aircraft. 
Article 79 states that the company must provide technical equipment and the necessary personnel for the prevention 
of accidents and incidents in the air. Accidents are defined as those events that cause death or serious injury to 
persons aboard the aircraft or cause structural damage to the plane. Accidents also include vanishing airplanes, as 
well as those that land in inaccessible places. An incident is as an event which affects or could affect the safety of 
flight operations but which does not become an accident. 
The SCT has the authority to sanction companies who violate the Civil Aviation Law. According to Article 
86(II)(g), companies with planes that do not have safety instruments and related auxiliary equipment will be fined 
between 500 and 5,000 of the minimum salaries. Article 86(V)states that, when, in a negligent manner, incidents and 
accidents are not reported to the SCT, a fine of 1000 to 8000 the minimum salaries will be sanctioned. Article 
88(XI) calls for the pilot to be fined between 300 and 3,000 of the minimum salaries if he does not inform the SCT 
or the closest airport commander within 48 hours of any accidents or incidents. Article 89 states the following: 
Any other violation of this law or its regulations not explicitly provided in this chapter, will be sanctioned by the 
Ministry with a fine of 200 to 5,000 days of minimum salary. 
 
In case of relapse, the Ministry can impose a sanction equivalent up to double the outstanding amount.152 
 
6.2.3 Regulations of the Civil Aviation Law 
According to Article 84, all airlines must establish and maintain a training program authorized 
by the SCT. The flight crew must have annual training for emergency situations, encompassing 
their specific duties, the handling of emergency equipment, and the effects of a lack of oxygen 
due to depressurization. Article 93 mandates that the training take place in a SCT-authorized 
training center. Finally, Article 103(III) asserts that the company is responsible to the SCT for 
having its flight attendants know the regulations and procedures applicable to their duties. 
38 
 
Article 113 commands the flight crew to be in their seats during takeoff, landing, and during 
other circumstances when necessary. The crew also must assure that all passengers are seated 
with their seatbelts fastened. Article 115 states that the pilot is not to initiate a flight when 
technical circumstances put the safety of the flight in peril, and Article 109 requires the company 
to notify the SCT within 24 hours following any equipment or service deficiency during flight 
operations.  
6.3 ICAO Standards 
Annex 6 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation provides member countries with international standards 
and recommended practices regarding the operation of aircraft.153 After a standard is adopted, it is put into effect by 
each ICAO member state in its own territories. Chapter 12 of this annex lists five standards specific to the cabin 
crew. Section 12.1 states that the operator of the aircraft, to its government's satisfaction, must establish the 
necessary duties of the cabin crew to be performed in an emergency for each type of airplane. According to Section 
12.2, each flight attendant assigned to emergency evacuation duty must occupy a seat as specified in Section 6.16 of 
this annex.154 Regarding the protection of the cabin crew during flight, "each cabin crew member shall be seated 
with seat belt or, when provided, safety harness fastened during take-off and landing and whenever the pilot-in-
command so directs."155 The ICAO standard for flight attendant training is found in Section 12.4 of Annex 6, which 
states the following: 
An operator shall establish and maintain a training programme, approved by the State of the operator, to be 
completed by all persons before being assigned as a cabin crew member. Cabin crew shall complete a recurrent 
training programme annually. These training programmes shall ensure that each person is: 
 
a) competent to execute those safety duties and functions which the cabin crew member is assigned to perform in the 
event of an emergency or in a situation requiring emergency evacuation; 
 
b) drilled and capable in the use of emergency and life-saving equipment required to be carried, such as life jackets, 
life rafts, evacuation slides, emergency exits, portable fire extinguishers, oxygen equipment and first-aid kits; 
 
c) when serving on aeroplanes operated above 3,000 m (10 000 ft), knowledgeable as regards the effect of lack of 
oxygen and, in the case of pressurized areoplanes, as regards physiological phenomena accompanying a loss of 
pressurization; 
 
d) aware of other crew members' assignments and functions in the event of an emergency so far as is necessary for 
the fulfillment of the cabin crew member's own duties; [and] 
*** 
 
f) knowledgeable about human performance as related to passenger cabin safety duties including flight crew-cabin 
crew co-ordination.156 
In addition, Section 12.5 calls for each member country to establish regulations concerning flight time, flight duty 
periods, and rest periods for the cabin crew.  
Other standards set forth in Annex 6 also are relevant to the instant submission. Section 6.2.2 states that airplanes 
must be equipped with accessible and adequate medical supplies, and it is recommended that these supplies include 
one or more first-aid kits and a medical kit for doctors in aircraft authorized to carry more than 250 passengers. The 
airplane also must be outfitted with portable fire extinguishers and a seat, complete with seatbelt, for each person 
over the minimum age set by the country of the operator. Furthermore, Section 8.1.1 states that the operator of the 
aircraft must ensure that the airplane's certificate of airworthiness is valid and that the airplane is maintained in an 
airworthy condition, in accordance with its government's regulations. The operator also must assure that the 
airplane's operational and emergency equipment is serviceable. 
39 
 
 
6.4 Analysis 
Two occupational safety and health issues were raised in this submission: (1) non-compliance 
with required training for flight attendants and (2) safety hazards aboard TAESA aircraft. In 
support of their allegations, the submitters provided testimonial statements, maintenance reports 
filed by flight attendants to TAESA management, and an ASSA report to the International 
Transport Workers Federation detailing the safety and health problems and training deficiencies 
at TAESA. 
 
6.4.1 Flight Attendant Training 
Under Mexican civil aviation regulations, airlines are required to provide training to their flight 
attendants. In her testimony, Ms. Barrales spoke of these requirements in relation to the situation 
at TAESA: 
The airline regulations in Mexico stipulate that flight attendants must be trained, certain areas 
specified of importance for us to know, tests that we have to pass, so that we can guarantee 
security on board an aircraft. These areas are areas where TAESA flight attendants weren't 
trained. We constantly complained about this. They were hired, they were given a license which 
credited them as flight attendants as if they had received this training, and they were immediately 
put on the plane. 
 
We, our colleagues, gave us all this information. And we proved that they were flying in planes 
that they didn't even know on many occasions how the doors operated, or internal changes in the 
equipment. For those of us that are involved in this activity, that's a dangerous risk. We need to 
know the changes in the equipment and all of this. The airlines, the Mexican airlines have the 
obligation to train attendants in these aspects, and this was never the case with TAESA.157 
In the ASSA report to the Civil Aviation Section Committee of the International Transport 
Workers Federation,158 ASSA states, however, that TAESA is registered as a training center by 
the DGAC, giving initial and periodic training for its flight attendants. The report states that 
initial training at the company lasts three weeks to a month and covers three modules. In the first 
phase, training is provided in a classroom environment, where the students learn such subjects as 
Mexican and foreign regulations, the rights and duties of flight attendants, safety procedures, and 
emergency equipment. The second module solely consists of first aid training, which is taught by 
TAESA's medical department. The last training module covers aircraft and emergency 
equipment demonstrations. 
The aforementioned report asserts that the third module is insufficient for the proper training of 
flight attendants, as it does not incorporate the practical simulations of emergencies 
recommended in ICAO's Cabin Attendant Safety Training Manual.159 According to the report, 
TAESA did not provide simulated training on emergency evacuations of a full passenger 
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airplane with fire and smoke in the cabin; nor were the flight attendants allowed to practice with 
the different types of fire extinguishers found aboard the aircraft. The report also states that the 
training failed to include ditching simulations, escape chute launchings and slidings, and how to 
properly use a life raft.  
At the public hearing, Mr. Alvarez compared the training he received at TAESA with that which 
he had undergone while working at Aeromexico: 
The first aid and emergency classes in almost all of the companies, as I said, I worked for seven 
years at Aeromexico, and we had two weeks to a month of this kind of training . . . And in 
TAESA we only received two days of training per year. Two days to train people that have never 
been flight attendants? That's inconceivable. 
 
We flew seven different types of airplanes with different needs, how to open the doors, or where 
the security and safety system are, oxygen systems. So, if it was difficult for me to be in all of 
these, you can imagine how difficult it was for all the rest of the flight attendants.160 
With his level of experience, Mr. Alvarez wanted to become a training instructor, but the 
manager of the flight attendants at TAESA denied his request. However, according to Mr. 
Alvarez, the person in charge of the administration of the flight attendants, who had flown only 
twice, was given an instructor's license.161  
The submitters assert that Mexico failed to enforce its laws regarding the training of flight 
attendants and is therefore in violation of the NAALC. Article 84 of the Regulations of the Civil 
Aviation Law states that the airline must establish and maintain a training program authorized by 
the SCT. In her testimony, Ms. Barrales claimed that TAESA flight attendants were issued 
licenses without training. This conflicts with the information ASSA provided in its report to the 
International Transport Workers Federation. In that report, ASSA stated that "it is known that the 
company gives initial and periodical training for its flight attendants [and is] actually registered 
as a Training Center at DGAC."162 
Article 84 also states that the flight crew must have annual training for emergency situations and 
that this training must include their specific duties, the handling of emergency equipment, and 
the effects of depressurization. This is in accordance with ICAO standards. ASSA's report to the 
International Transport Workers Federation did address deficiencies it found with respect to 
Article 84 in TAESA's training module covering aircraft and emergency equipment 
visualization. The testimony presented at the hearing on this matter also is convincing.  
The Mexican NAO presented information to the U.S. NAO, providing the relevant law and 
regulations covering flight attendant training but did not provide information on the standards set 
by the SCT for such training. Moreover, the U.S. NAO has received no information with respect 
to the SCT's monitoring of training programs at TAESA. 
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6.4.2 Flight Safety 
During the public hearing, the flight attendants presented an alarming image of the safety hazards aboard TAESA 
aircraft, declaring that TAESA airplanes were in no condition to fly due to poor maintenance. In support of his 
declaration, Mr. Barrientos gave the example of TAESA Flight 678 from Mexico City to Chicago, previously 
mentioned in Section 5.3 regarding minimum employment standards:  
When we were in Mexico, the captain informed the Maintenance Department that there was a problem with the 
pressure on the aircraft. The technical personnel took the captain a part that was presumably the cause of the 
problem, telling him that they were going to change it. They brought him a new part and said it was going to be 
installed. 
 
We took off from Mexico [City]; we landed in Morelia, and when we got to Morelia, the captain checked the 
pressurization problem again; they told him they were going to fix it. Taking off from Morelia for Chicago, 10 
minutes later the captain called me into the cabin to tell me we were going to have to land in Guadalajara because 
the plane couldn't go on to Chicago because we still had the pressurization problem we had in Mexico [City]. 
 
Landing in Guadalajara, the captain called the mechanic and told him we had a pressurization problem. So they went 
down to check the area where presumably the problem was, and he saw that the part that presumably had been 
changed in Mexico [City] was the same one. He'd been deceived; they hadn't changed it.163 
Mr. Alvarez also recounted a terrifying experience while on duty on TAESA Flight 8312 from Tapachula to Mexico 
City on September 15, 1998: 
Thirty minutes after take off, the plane lost pressure, and the masks fell. I took the closest one, covered my mouth, 
but there was no oxygen. I took a portable bottle after I stood up, and I put it on. And what I had been taught at 
Aeromexico was to go and see how the pilots were doing and make sure that they had their oxygen masks on as 
well. They did have their masks on, but two minutes later there was no oxygen for them either. 
 
I took off my bottle, and I gave it to the pilot. And the pilot declared an emergency. His name is Captain Balter, and 
we returned to Tapachula. In Tapachula, I checked the flight attendants cabin, and I found that 52 oxygen masks had 
not come out of their compartments. You can imagine, 52 passengers without oxygen in the air. What would have 
happened if I had not gone to check how the pilots were doing? They could have suffocated. What would have 
happened? 
 
When I arrived in Mexico [City], I made my report at the Flight Attendant's Agency... And in that report, I informed 
what took place and what masks did not come out of their compartments. This report was never answered by the 
management of the flight attendants. I looked into the matter with the mechanics, and they said that the ducts, the 
oxygen ducts or tubes were plugged. They had dust, and they had other things blocking them. In fact, some of the 
masks did not have the elastic band on them.164 
According to the flight attendants, numerous such incidents happened at TAESA, and they often feared a plane 
would crash. The flight attendants said that such an accident occurred on November 9, 1999, with five crew 
members and thirteen passengers losing their lives. Mr. Barrientos recounted the safety hazards aboard the ill-fated 
aircraft: 
But many of us felt that that accident, if the aircraft had had the minimum maintenance, that accident could have 
been avoided because that aircraft was in terrible, terrible condition. That plane was the X8TKN. I know it was in 
awful condition. It was like the second-hand truck. It shouldn't have been allowed to fly at all. 
 
For example, in the passenger cabin, the flight attendants' seat in the main station should be retractable so that if 
there is an accident, it can be -- you can get out quickly. This wasn't retractable, it would fall down. If we sat down, 
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the seat would fall. We had to sort of hang on so that the seat wouldn't fall. 
 
The main door didn't close, so there was always a leak, a pressure leak on all flights. The smoke detectors in the 
bathrooms, since the ones that came with the plane were no longer any good, they bought some in the supermarket. 
Home models and they put them in the bathrooms. But since they wouldn't buy any batteries for them, the batteries 
would wear out and then they didn't work, they wouldn't work. 
 
Lights in the cabin . . . didn't work. So, as far as the accident is concerned, had they been able to land, there would 
have been the likelihood that the lights wouldn't have gone on, they wouldn't have been able to find the exit. The 
microphone from the pilots to us didn't work. So, if they called us they couldn't reach us.165 
As part of their duties, the TAESA flight attendants were required to inspect the cabin area for every flight and to 
report any deficiencies. The flight attendants provided the U.S. NAO with copies of their cabin maintenance reports 
for twenty-three TAESA aircraft, covering 1993 to 1997. These reports repeatedly detail problems with the 
emergency equipment aboard the airplanes. The flight attendants noted inoperative emergency tracking lights, an 
inadequate number of life jackets, and depleted first aid kits. Problems were also reported with the escape chutes, 
fire extinguishers, oxygen masks, and portable oxygen bottles. Faulty seats and seat belts were documented as well. 
In addition, the flight attendants consistently reported the bathrooms to be unclean and odorous and also indicated 
that toilets would not flush. 
The flight attendants documented similar safety hazards on at least sixteen other TAESA aircraft, and these findings 
were presented in ASSA's report to the International Transport Workers Federation.166 Of the six McDonnell 
Douglas DC-9 airplanes presented in the report, all had inoperative microphones, intercoms, and call buttons 
between the flight attendants and the pilots. The evacuation alarm on the main doors of these planes was noted to be 
inoperative, and the exit signs were not lighted and would fall off during take off and landings. In addition, the flight 
attendants reported broken overhead baggage compartment locks, seats that would not lock in their upright position, 
and seatbelts that would not fasten. Also described were inoperative oxygen masks, the lack of freon gas 
extinguishers, and emergency exits that were blocked by an extra row of seats. 
The report also documented safety and health hazards aboard Boeing 727 and 737 series airplanes. The flight 
attendants reported damaged intercom systems, inoperative emergency tracking lights, and cracked windows. Food 
supplies were stowed inside specially designated emergency equipment compartments. A main door on one 727 
would open during taxi, take off, and landing. There were also reports of pressure leaks, some caused by gaps 
between the frames and doors of the aircrafts. 
In her testimony, Ms. Barrales stated that ASSA had presented such evidence to the aviation authorities regarding 
the safety hazards on TAESA airplanes and that the DGAC told ASSA it would work to resolve the problems.167 
Ms. Barrales did acknowledge that some inspections were made but insisted that no action really was taken as a 
consequence of ASSA's complaints.168 Indeed, Mr. Centeno stated the following when asked about government 
inspections: 
At least the department that I was in, we always knew ahead of time that certain authorities were going to come and 
inspect certain aircraft. So the company was always prepared so that there wouldn't be any kind of violation visible 
to these authorities. But they knew ahead of time when these inspections were going to take place, these visits on the 
part of the authorities.169 
After the crash on November 9, 1999, the Mexican Government suspended the airline while it conducted an 
comprehensive investigation, reviewing the company's policies, procedures, maintenance, training and operations. A 
complete inspection of the TAESA fleet was carried out. In its press release concerning the findings of the 
investigation, the SCT first noted that:  
the aviation authority applied, in a permanent and systematic manner, its Annual Inspection Program to all the 
national airlines. This Program includes the review of documentation, reports, and controls of the companies in 
order to evaluate the state of airworthiness of the air fleet, as well as physical inspections of the airplanes and 
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inspection of flights in route.170 
Then, the SCT reported that, in its special inspection of TAESA, it detected important problems in the areas of 
maintenance, operation, training, and administration. The investigators made sixty-nine observations, emphasizing 
deficiencies in the organizational structure, a lack of updated manuals, and insufficient financial, human, and 
material resources.171 As reported in the SCT press release, "the defects found did not affect flight safety on their 
own. However, there was the possibility that when combined, they could put flight operation at risk."172 
Accordingly, the DGAC set forty-three conditions with which TAESA had to comply before it would authorize the 
re-initiation of operations. For example, the inspectors observed six planes that required excessive maintenance, and, 
due to the age of these planes and the difficulty of acquiring the necessary parts, the DGAC mandated that these 
planes be retired.173 Press reports indicate that TAESA has complied with the maintenance and operation 
requirements,174 but the airline has been unable to find the financial capital necessary to guarantee the viability of its 
operations. TAESA has filed for bankruptcy, and its aviation license has expired.  
The submitters presented convincing and credible information concerning occupational safety and health aboard 
TAESA aircraft. The testimony of the flight attendants describes a workplace fraught with safety hazards. Article 79 
of the Civil Aviation Law states that the company must provide technical equipment for the prevention of accidents 
and incidents in the air. According to the flight attendants, such equipment was inoperative aboard the airplanes. 
Their testimony is corroborated by the maintenance reports that they filed with TAESA.  
The witnesses at the public hearing acknowledged that the Mexican aviation authority had completed inspections of 
TAESA airplanes, as was indicated in the SCT's press release. The U.S. NAO requested from the Mexican NAO the 
history of inspection enforcement at TAESA, but no information was provided. Given the numerous safety and 
health deficiencies noted in the flight attendants' maintenance reports and the lack of forthcoming information from 
the Mexican Government, it is unclear the extent to which Mexican safety and health laws were enforced effectively 
with respect to TAESA. However, the U.S. NAO recognizes that, in the aftermath of the November 9th crash, the 
SCT did undertake a comprehensive inspection of TAESA and set the forty-three conditions with which the airline 
had to comply before it could resume operations.  
 
7. Findings 
Mexico's Constitution and Federal Labor Law provide for the protection of freedom of 
association and the right of workers to join unions of their choice free from intimidation or 
interference. Procedures exist to challenge existing labor contracts, including the right to petition 
administrative and judicial bodies for review of such challenges. Mexican law also recognizes 
the right to form craft unions and to bargain on behalf of such crafts within a work place. The 
fact that ASSA represents flight attendants at other airlines in Mexico suggests that flight 
attendants can be an appropriate and distinct craft for representation within the Mexican airline 
industry. 
However, the CAB, up to this point, has ruled that ASSA cannot gain title to the existing labor 
contract at TAESA because it would require fragmentation of an existing contract. In addition, 
the CAB has ruled that ASSA, as a craft union, is not eligible to represent all employees. ASSA 
has consistently maintained throughout these proceedings that it only seeks to represent the flight 
attendants. The primary issue raised by this submission is, considering the legal precedent 
adopted by the CAB, whether a craft union has any legal opportunity to seek representation of 
workers at a firm in the face of an existing company-wide agreement. 
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The CAB decisions in this case appear to be within Mexican legal precedent. This precedent 
does not permit the fragmentation of an existing contract, thus limiting a craft union's ability to 
represent potential members. It has been suggested that, under the circumstances presented here, 
a craft union could petition for representation under a separate and new collective bargaining 
agreement, rather than taking action related to an existing collective labor contract. Nevertheless, 
it remains unclear how the FLL provisions recognizing craft unions can be implemented in a 
case where a company-wide union exists. Moreover, this issue is even more significant given the 
historical practice in Mexico of collective bargaining agreements being signed with employers at 
the inception of the company and routinely renewed. 
While the U.S. NAO does not find that the CAB or the courts have failed to enforce Mexican law 
in this case, either by directly refusing to apply the law or by using technical legal procedures to 
frustrate the true nature of the ASSA request, further information would be helpful in 
determining how the precedent applied in this case is consistent with the FLL provisions 
recognizing craft union rights and how Mexican law provides for a craft union to seek 
representation of workers in its craft where a company-wide collective labor agreement already 
exists. 
With regard to NAALC obligations concerning access to fair, equitable, and transparent 
proceedings in this case, the CAB failed to hold a hearing before making its original ruling and 
then neglected to do so again after such a hearing was mandated by the Court. However, 
following a subsequent court ruling instructing it to do so, the CAB held hearings and provided 
ASSA the opportunity to present evidence. Additionally, in each instance, the CAB and the 
appellate courts provided reasoned legal opinions in support of their decisions. Further, ASSA 
was able to seek review by appellate courts of four CAB rulings, and, in three of those cases, 
received favorable decisions vacating the CAB decisions. Thus, it does not appear that Mexico 
failed to meet its obligations under Article 5(1) to assure that its tribunals are fair, equitable and 
transparent. Similarly, although the proceedings in this case have been lengthy, they are not 
unduly so in view of the complex legal issues involved.  
The U.S. NAO finds that there is substantial evidence to question whether the representation 
election process conducted at TAESA was in conformity with Mexico's labor law and its 
obligations under the NAALC. Clearly a representation election where workers must declare 
their choice in the open and in front of hostile management and opposing union personnel, where 
workers are subject to intimidation and threats prior to and during the election, and where 
eligible voters are denied access to the voting area, is not likely to have an outcome of free 
choice. 
In view of the information regarding the atmosphere at the election, as well as similar 
information in other cases reviewed by the NAO, it is not clear how Mexican labor authorities 
are able to assure the integrity of the election process. Consultations at the ministerial level 
would contribute to a better understanding as to how Mexican law ensures the integrity of the 
union election process so that workers are able to freely choose their bargaining representatives, 
including the authority and responsibility under Mexican law of CAB officials present during a 
representation election and in proceedings concerning challenges to the conduct of an election. 
These questions include how Mexico assures that CABs are impartial and independent and do 
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not have a substantial interest in the outcome of a matter, in view of situations where CAB 
members ruling in a case are representatives of competing unions or employers.  
The dismissal of workers who supported ASSA is an additional element of concern. Many of 
these workers have filed complaints alleging improper dismissal. Their cases are pending, and 
the U.S. NAO is not aware of final decisions in any of the cases. However, the timing of the 
dismissals, the particular workers dismissed, and the lack of notification of the basis for the 
dismissals have the appearance of being related to the workers' union representation votes. 
Therefore, it would be appropriate to further consult in order to clarify the procedures under 
Mexican law that must be followed in the application of the exclusion clause. 
The U.S. NAO finds substantial support to conclude that Mexico has undertaken efforts to 
enforce its laws concerning payroll tax contributions. Although the TAESA employees provided 
information of the TAESA's failure to meet its obligations under the law, the U.S. NAO's review 
found that significant legal action has been taken against the company, including placing 
financial attachments against the company and indictments against management. The 
government is also involved in bankruptcy proceedings in which appropriate payments are being 
sought. ASSA also indicated that complaints have been filed on behalf of the workers in this 
regard and that a successful outcome is anticipated. The U.S. NAO will continue to seek updated 
information from Mexico on this matter. 
The U.S. NAO's review included substantial inquiry into the overtime and occupational safety 
and health issues raised by the submitters. The submitters provided credible information of 
disturbing neglect by the company in these areas. Since the focus of this review by the U.S. NAO 
is on government enforcement efforts, the U.S. NAO sought information from the Government 
of Mexico on the enforcement history regarding compliance with regulations governing 
overtime, training requirements, and safety and health aboard aircraft at TAESA. Article 16(2) of 
the NAALC obligates Parties to provide information requested by an NAO of another Party. 
However, Mexico has not fully responded to the U.S. NAO request for this information. The 
U.S. NAO will continue to seek the relevant information from the Mexican Government. 
 
8. Recommendation 
Accordingly, the U.S. NAO recommends ministerial consultations regarding NAO Submission 9901 pursuant to 
Article 22 of the NAALC. 
 
Lewis Karesh 
Acting Secretary 
U.S. National Administrative Office 
July 7, 2000 
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